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THE WARSAW CONVENTION: A NEW LOOK AT JURISDICTION
UNDER ARTICLES 17 AND 28 AND THE PROBLEM OF
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
David H. Barnes
Mark G. Gebo
Thomas D. Myers

Almost half a century ago, delegates from developed nations throughout the world drafted the Warsaw Convention, a landmark multinational treaty which laid the ground rules for passenger recovery against
air carriers resulting from damage sustained on international flights. In
its day, the Convention resolved many of the transnational difficulties
facing the budding air transportation industry, including the possibly
disastrous effects of a single, large crash,' the lack of uniform international standards, 2 the need for ensuring comparable treatment for similarly situated passengers, and the potentially serious problem of jurisdiction.3 Furthermore, it performed a valuable function in lending an
element of predictability and certainty to air carriers' risks. In recent
decades, however, the realities of international air travel and legal
concepts of jurisdiction and tort liability have undergone radical transformation, turning the Warsaw Convention into a relic of a bygone era.
Several attempts have been made to deal with the situation, and some
agreements have superceded portions of the Convention which were
particularly deficient, but much revision must still be done. This Comment explores three selected areas of current concern: the Convention's
coverage of embarking and disembarking passengers under Article 17,
jurisdiction of manufacturers' contribution actions under Article 28(1),
and the general problem of limiting the liability of aircraft manufacturers under strict liability suits. Proposals for resolution of the problems
will be made in each case, but the underlying difficulty-the fact that
the Warsaw Convention was drafted against a factual and legal background which no longer exists-must be resolved by a redrafting of the
entire Convention rather than by piecemeal legal patchwork.
1. H. DRION, LIMIrATIONS OF LBILrITy IN INTERNATIONAL Am LAW 14-20 (1954).
2. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1967).
3. Mennell & Simone, United States Policy and the Warsaw Convention, 2 WASHBURN
L.J. 219, 222-23 (1963).
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I
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

In 1929, representatives from many of the "air nations" throughout
the world met in Warsaw, Poland, to conclude the multinational agreement known as the Warsaw Convention.' Among the important innovations which surfaced in Warsaw were the contractualization of the
passenger-carrier relationship,5 the imposition of a liability ceiling of
$8,291 per passenger claim for personal injury or wrongful death brought
against an international air carrier,6 and sharply defined jurisdictional
requirements for suits against an airline
At the time the Convention was concluded, these formulae seemed to
provide the panacea the aviation community needed. $8,300 was a very
satisfactory personal injury settlement for a defendant in the early
1930's.8 The fixed limit was small enough to induce the airlines to settle
quickly and often at the full amount, and speedy settlements all but
eliminated costly and protracted litigation. Furthermore, air carriers
often avoided the adverse publicity that the news media brought to such
trials.' The United States, as a global pacesetter in aviation, succeeded
4. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.NT.S. 11 (effective
Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention]. There was a five-year lag

between the drafting of the Convention and United States adherence, which reflected
considerable debate over its provisions. See D. GOEDHuIs, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND
THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1937); Boyle, The Warsaw Convention, 8 THE FORUM (ABA) 268

(1972); Cha, The Air Carrier'sLiability to Passengersin InternationalLaw, 7 AIR L. REv.
25 (1936); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2; Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA.
L. REv. 423 (1945); Sullivan, The Codification of Air CarrierLiability by International
Convention, 7 J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1936).
5. Warsaw Convention, art. 3. This Article required that the carrier deliver the passenger a ticket specifying contract terms and provided that "if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself
of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability." For a discussion
of the contractual relationship, see Reilly, The Warsaw Ticket to Judicial Treaty Revision-Will We Do it Again?, 43 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 396 (1969).
6. Warsaw Convention, art. 22.
7. Id., art. 28(1). Cases concerning this jurisdictional provision include Smith v. Cana-

dian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Aanestad v. Air Canada, Ltd., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Calif.
1975); Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines," 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975); Varkonyi
v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao, et al. (VARIG), 71 Misc. 2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co. 1972). For a lengthy discussion of this provision, see part III infra.
8. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499.
9. DRION, supra note 1, at 37-40.
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in justifying this somewhat artificial "insulation of the airlines" as a
necessary step in bolstering an infant industry."
B.

THE HAGUE PROTOCOL

Some twenty-five years after Warsaw, the signatories of the original
treaty convened at The Hague to re-examine the impact and liability
limits of their original accord." There was considerable sentiment that
the Warsaw Treaty had not kept pace with the changing demands of
international air law. By the late nineteen-fifties $8,300 had become
unrealistically low as a settlement in much crash litigation.' 2 It represented perhaps only a fraction of what otherwise might have been fairly
allowable damages in a personal injury or wrongful death action arising
from an air carrier's negligence under domestic law.'3
The delegates at The Hague responded with a treaty that effectively
doubled the potential liability of air carriers in international travel.
10. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1272, 1277 (1964). The Convention, one commentator has said,
was an attempt "to create an international convention which would be of great aid and
assistance to a new but increasingly important form of international transportation."
Parker, The Adequacy of the Passenger Liability Limits of the Warsaw Convention of
1929, 14 J. AIR L. & CoNt. 37, 39 (1947).
11. The Hague Protocol, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140-1 & 2 (1955) [hereinafter cited as the
Hague Protocol]. For a convenient text of the Hague Protocol and the Convention which
it amended, see CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED
MATERIALS 324-66 (1963). See Mennell & Simone, supra note 3, at 500-09. Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of New York, Comm. on Aeronautics, Report on the Warsaw Convention as
Amended by the Hague Protocol, in 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 255 (1959); Calkins, Grand
Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am L. & CoM. 253 (1956).
12. Earlier in the decade the celebrated Jane Froman case, reported sub nom. Ross v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 947 (1955), brought the controversial $8,291 Warsaw limit under international scrutiny. The plaintiff, a popular entertainer, sustained serious personal injury and incurred
huge medical expenses resulting from an air crash in Portugal. Despite the irreparable
damage to her career, she was limited to an $8,291 recovery against the airline. She
apparently fell short of proving willful misconduct on the part of the air carrier, which is
the only escape from the Convention's liability limits. See Warsaw Convention, art. 25(2).
Discussions of this Article and its application include Acosta, Willful Misconduct Under
the Warsaw Convention: Recent Trends and Developments, 19 U. MIAmI L. REv. 575
(1965); Strock, Warsaw Convention-Article 25-"Wilful Misconduct," 32 J. AIR L. &
CoN. 291 (1966).
13. It has been stated that, through the use of established actuarial principles, economic loss caused by death can be reasonably determined. Under this method, "an $8,300
or $75,000 limitation of damages against a commercial air carrier for negligent operation
of an airplane could be less than half of one percent of the easily calculable present value
of the certain economic loss, using the most conservative of evaluations." Kennelly,
Aviation Accidents-Liability of Manufacturers-Part1, 18 TR. LAWYER'S GUIDE 158, 166
(1974).
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Unfortunately, the response to these readjustments was not as favorable
as that to the original Convention. First, it seemed that even a $16,000
recovery no longer induced plaintiffs to quick settlements." Second,
competing domestic carriers and ground-haul industries began to voice
their complaints that the original justification for liability limits, that
of protecting an "infant industry," had outlived its usefulness. 5 More
importantly, the somewhat mildly inflated liability rate structure that
emerged from the Protocol evidenced a serious short-sightedness by the
draftsmen. Inroads in the area of products liability were well established
by this time, 6 and it easily could have been foreseen that suits directly
against airline manufacturers would produce problems that the Protocol
was ill-equipped to handle."7
C.

THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT

By the mid 1960's the conflict over air carrier liability limits had
reached peak levels. Considerable opposition had arisen in the United
States to the deficient Hague Protocol." In November of 1965 the Department of State deposited a formal notice of denunciation of both the
Convention and the Protocol, to take effect within half a year unless a
new agreement for a $75,000 liability limit was concluded, coupled with
"a reasonable prospect of an international agreement.

. .

inthe area

of $100,000 per passenger."' 9 A convention was convened in Montreal
the following spring, which resulted in no solution, but an interim agreement was eventually concluded with the airlines setting the level of
14. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 510.
15. By the mid 1950's our international airlines composed a healthy and rapidly ex-

panding industry. In 1954 Trans World Airlines reported $10.3 million net earnings on
gross revenues of $203.7 million, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, 1954 ANNUAL REPORT, and Pan
American reported net earnings of $10.4 million on a gross revenue of $218.9 million, PAN
AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, 1954 ANNUAL REPORT.
16. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1910).
17. This backward-looking critique is not really unfair, since the Protocol's weaknesses
were readily discoverable at the time of its drafting. The rights and liabilities of manufacturers might well have been treated in the document had the products liability issue been
squarely addressed. It was simply naive to believe that the "protection of an infant
industry" argument would hold water after twenty-five years.
18. For a discussion of American opposition to the Hague Protocol, see Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 510-12, 533-52. See also, Hearingson the HagueProtocol to
the Warsaw ConventionBefore the Senate ForeignRelations Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); Hildred, Air Carrier'sLiability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention and
Events Leading up to the MontrealAgreement, 33 J. Am L. & Com. 521 (1967).
19. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965). See Kreindler, The Dununciationof the Warsaw
Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291 (1965).

19761

The Warsaw Convention

liability at $75,000 and making the carrier absolutely liable."0
Practically speaking, the results of Montreal proved to be no less
myopic than those of The Hague Protocol. The new limits were restricted to cases where the air travel had a "contact" with the United
States.' Such an arbitrary determination of risk has been sharply criticized.Y Concern for the aircraft manufacturers' potential liability and
uniformity of risk were abandoned in favor of a "rush job" aimed at a
handful of American travelers who happened to have purchased tickets
on flights with the necessary United States contacts.
D.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

An attempt at codifying the Montreal Agreement in treaty form was
made in the 1971 Guatemala Protocol,2 which raised the liability limit
to $100,000 with periodic increases and also established strict liability.
The new agreement, however, precluded any additional recovery based
on willful misconduct or violation of the Convention's notice requirements. The Protocol is so structured that it will not become effective
without United States' approval, and the likelihood of this is slim at
24
best.
Recent decades have seen the provisions and underlying rationales of
all these agreements begin to crumble. Aircraft manufacturers, who
were conspicuously unrepresented at Warsaw, often face jurisdictional
26
barsn to crossclaims against carriers for contribution or indemnity.
Litigation arising from an interpretation of Article 17 has drawn close
scrutiny in an effort to pinpoint the time at which the Warsaw provi20. The Montreal Agreement, C.A.B. Order No. 22,984, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as the Montreal Agreement].
21. See Kennelly, supra note 13. This represents the significant concession for which
the foreign air carriers were willing to endorse the Montreal Agreement. The new $75,000
limit was to be enforceable against carriers only when some point in the United States
was the ticketed point of departure, destination, or agreed stopover of an international

flight.
22. Id. From the passenger's or manufacturer's point of view, there is no difference
whatsoever in the risks of a London to Montreal run compared to a Paris to New York
flight. Yet the London-Montreal run is subject to the Hague Protocol limits while the
Paris-New York flight is governed by the Montreal Agreement. It is unclear why carrier
liability should vary by as much as $58,000 per passenger.
23. The Guatemala Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971), reprintedin 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
613 (1971).

24. See Boyle, The GuatemalaProtocol, 6 AKRON L. REv. 123 (1973); Mankiewicz, The
1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to FurtherAmend the 1929 War Convention, 38 J. AIR
L. & Com. 519 (1972).
25. See part mI infra.
26. See part IV infra.
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sions attach and terminate with respect to any international flight."
To illustrate the numerous controversies surrounding Warsaw and the
subsequent conventions, we posit the following hypothetical. Radar and
Vector are two attorneys residing in New York. While attending an
American Bar Association convention in Montreal, they secure tickets
from a local travel agent for an upcoming trip. Together they board an
ill-fated flight in New York-Radar bound for Boston and Vector for
London by way of Boston-on an aircraft owned and operated by a
United States carrier. Subsequent sections will explore a variety of legal
problems that commonly arise depending on the location and circumstance of the tragedy. The basic distinction to be made is that Radar,
bound only to Boston, is considered to be a domestic passenger and
hence not subject to the provisions of the Warsaw, Hague, or Montreal
agreements. Vector, who may well have occupied the adjoining seat, is
recognized to be on an international flight" (albeit the domestic segment), and is subject to the Convention limitations outlined above.
II
EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING: THE PARAMETERS OF
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Mark G. Gebo
The Warsaw Convention has often been faulted for its limitation on
passenger recovery for personal injuries,"9 but recently another aspect of
the personal injury recovery has been the subject of increasing attention.
This is the question of how far the Convention extends to cover injuries
to passengers embarking and disembarking at air terminals. It is unclear
whether the Convention was intended to apply to these cases.
The governing Convention provision as to personal injury actions is
Article 17, which states that:
27. See part II infra.
28. Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2) defines international flight as:
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the
place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break
in the transportation. . . , are either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereingty . . . of
another power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.
Article 1(3) makes it clear that this definition of international flight applies even to
transportation to be performed by successive carriers.
29. This critique, of course, has led to the Hague Protocol and Montreal Agreement
Amendments described in part I supra. See generally DRION, supra note 1; Parker, The
Adequacy of the PassengerLiability Limits of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J. AIR
L. & COM. 37 (1947).
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The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the injury so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking."
The final phrase of this section, at the time the Convention was drafted,
was seen as a time/space consideration, limiting the presumption of
carrier liability to only those places and times when the passenger would
be exposed to risks peculiar to air travel." In the early years of the
32
Convention, this interpretation provoked discussion among scholars.
One school of thought felt that the geographic limitation was to apply
solely to the ramp or other similar device for entering and leaving the
plane, 33 but the weight of authority favored the view that the Convention covered not only passengers on the ramp, but those upon the traffic
apron as well.Y Under this view, "embarking or disembarking" covered
the process of getting the passenger from the terminal to the plane and
back again. The phrase was not to cover any accidents occurring within
the terminal. This line of reasoning was followed in three United States
cases involving the disembarking issue, 35 where the courts held that a
30. Warsaw Convention, art. 17. This Article does not create a cause of action, but
merely defines the limits of the Warsaw Convention's coverage, limiting the liability of
air carriers. Domestic law establishes the cause of action. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport,
351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973), 388 F. Supp.
1238, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 392,
314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App.
Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972).
For the early history of the cause of action under the Warsaw Convention, see Noel v.
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev'd, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1955); Wyman v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1943),
aff'd, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1944). See also Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the
Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 217 (1959); 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 452
(1974); 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 481 (1974); 39 J. Am L. & CoM. 433 (1973); 39 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 445 (1973); 36 MOD. L. REv. 303 (1973).
31. GOEDHUIS, supra note 4, at 187-90; Sullivan, Codification of Air CarrierLiability by
InternationalConvention, 7 J. Am L. CoM. 1, 20-21 (1936).
32. No early cases dealt with the Article 17 phrase "operations of embarking or disembarking." Indeed, the first reported decision was in a 1962 German case. See note 35 infra.
33. See IFrH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR NAVIGATION 1173 (1930).
34. GOEDHUIS, supra note 4, at 192-97; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 21.
35. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); Felismina v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
46 App. Div. 2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dep't 1974). Two foreign cases are of significance: Mache v. Air France, [1967] Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien 345 (Cour d'Appel
de Rouen 1967); Blumenfeld v. BEA, 11 Z.L.W. 78 (1962).
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passenger who left the aircraft and was safely within the terminal building had disembarked for purposes of Article 17 of the Convention. For
accidents occurring within the terminal the carrier was to be liable
under domestic law alone."
Recently, serious doubt has been cast on this traditional reasoning by
two federal court cases" which have concerned the embarking, rather
than the disembarking, end of the journey. These two cases have taken
dramatically different approaches to the issue, producing an undesirable conflict which could lead to forum shopping." This conflict becomes
even more significant in light of the proliferation of litigation which will
probably follow airport bombings such as that at the LaGuardia Airport
in New York City in December 1975.11 Therefore, these decisions must
be closely analyzed.
To aid in analyzing the two cases, posit our hypothetical lawyers
Radar and Vector at LaGuardia on that fateful night. Our travelers had
purchased their tickets in Montreal to take the same flight from New
York to Boston, Vector to continue on to London. We change the hypothetical here to make Vector's ticket read New York to Boston to London
and back again to New York.4" After looking at the two cases, this
section of the Comment will explore the question of who should bear the
risk, based on certain policy considerations. Then the discussion will
determine how our voyagers fare under the present law and in what
direction, if any, the law should develop.
A.

THE

DAY AN

EVANGELINOS DECISIONS

Both Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc." and Evangelinos v. Trans
36. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971).
37. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), aft'g, 393 F. Supp.
217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D.
Pa. 1975).
38. Davidson, FactorsInfluencing Choice of Forum in Aircraft DisasterLitigation, 23
FED. INS. COUN. Q. 23 (1972). Factors cited in this article include the presence or absence
of res ipsa loquitur, guest statutes, vicarious liability, conflict of laws rules, and liability
limits.
39. TIME, Jan. 12, 1976, at 8.
40. -Theeffect of this is to give Vector's trip jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention, since the ultimate destination is within the United States. This is not absolutely necessary, however, since the Montreal Agreement gives Warsaw jurisdiction if the
ticketed point of departure is within the United States. See Smith v. Canadian Pacific
Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1971); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d
851 (2d Cir. 1965); Aanestad v. Air Canada, Ltd., 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Calif. 1975);
Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975); Varkonyi v. S.A.
Empresa De Viacao, et al. (VARIG), 71 Misc. 2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1972). For a more detailed discussion of jurisdiction questions, see part III infra.
41. 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
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World Airlines, Inc.42 arose from the same TWA flight in 1973 from
Athens, Greece, to New York City." The plaintiffs were in line awaiting
a security screening in the transit lounge of the Hellenikon Airport in
Athens after having presented their tickets, checked their baggage, and
received their boarding passes. Two terrorists, and perhaps more, threw
grenades into the crowded area where the plaintiffs were waiting in line,
and continued their assault by firing sporadic barrages into the boarding
area. The terrorists took thirty-two passengers as hostages. After two
tense hours of negotiation an agreement was reached, but not before
forty TWA passengers had been wounded and three had died. The plaintiffs in Day represented one dead and two wounded passengers, and the
plaintiffs in Evangelinos represented wounded passengers only." In both
cases the defendant argued that the plaintiffs were not within any of the
"operations of embarking" when the injuries occurred, and, therefore,
that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable. On the issue of carrier
liability under the Convention, the cases came out differently; the Day
court awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff; 5 the Evangelinos
court, to the defendant. 6
1.

The Day Case

The Second Circuit in Day refused to follow the restrictiveness of the
disembarking cases;47 indeed, much of the opinion is based on original
treaty interpretation relying only at a minimum on prior Warsaw Convention decisions. Beginning with the proposition that "the language
employed in Article 17 must be the logical starting point," the court
established that incidents within a terminal building were not expressly
excluded by the phrase "in the course of any of the operations of embarking," and found that the draftsmen "looked to whether the passenger's actions were a part of the operation of embarking."48 Asserting that
"Article 17 does not define the period of time before passengers enter
42. 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
43. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 96 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
While the Day passengers' tickets were from Athens to New York City, the Evangelinos
plaintiffs were booked through to Pittsburgh by way of New York City. This difference is
insignificant except in terms of jurisdiction.
44. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 96 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Day
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 528 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1975).
45. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 103 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
47. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34, n.8 (2d Cir. 1975). MacDonald
v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971) is the only disembarking case even mentioned.
The court also ignored the Evangelinos embarking case.
48. 528 F.2d at 33.
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the interior of the airplane," it turned to the legislative history and
policy considerations to determine when the operation of embarking
commences.49 The court first recited the several steps that the plaintiffs
had already taken and determined that they "were not free agents." In
addition, the court expressed a general feeling that Article 17 should be
interpreted broadly to afford "protection to the plaintiffs under the
Warsaw liability umbrella." This position was taken to be consistent
with "modern theories of cost allocation,"5 to foster "the goal of accident prevention,"'5 ' and to give the passengers the administrative convenience of absolute liability, thus saving the plaintiffs from incurring
the additional expense and delay of having to sue the airport in a foreign
forum, under foreign law, and possibly
having to prove fault if the Con2
vention was held to be inapplicable.
The defendant insisted upon a more restrictive interpretation, but the
court, after examining the minutes of the Warsaw Convention, concluded otherwise. The originally proposed version of Article 17, it found,
was clearly intended to cover the passenger from the moment he entered
the terminal until he left; the Article was reworded only "to allow courts
to take into account the facts of each case."53
The Second Circuit also examined the expectations of the contracting
parties as to the purpose served by Article 17, and recognized that these
"expectations can . . .change over time.''54 Looking at the Montreal
Agreement and its history,55 the court concluded that "the protection of
passengers ranks high among the goals which the Warsaw signatories
now look to the Convention to serve," and felt that the rigid locationbased rule advocated by TWA would "ill serve" the goal of creating "a
system of liability rules that would cover all hazards of air travel."
Therefore, it approved of the "tripartite test based on activity (what the
plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose direction) and location" used
by the District Court in applying Article 17.11
49. Id.

50. The considerations here are primarily insurance-oriented. See Mendelsohn, Another
View on the Adequate Award in InternationalAviation Accidents, [1967] INS. L.J. 197.
51. The factors involved are that the airlines are in a better position to assess the
various risks, devise their own procedures to minimize the danger, and place pressure on
airport management to take preventive measures.

52. This is not the only alternative open to the plaintiffs if the Convention does not
apply. See notes 68-69 infra and accompanying text.
53. 528 F.2d at 35.
54. Id. at 36.
55. For a brief history of the Montreal Agreement, see notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
56. 528 F.2d at 33. For the District Court opinion, see Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The Evangelinos Case

Several months after the District Court opinion in Diy, a contrary
decision on virtually identical facts was rendered in the Evangelinos
case. That decision, like Day, claimed to implement the intentions of
the Convention's draftsmen, but the court took a more conservative
approach to interpretation and said that the bounds of Article 17 were
to be "determined from an examination of the 'four corners of the
treaty'.57 After specifically refusing to analogize to domestic law,5" as
the lower court had done in Day,59 the court turned to the legislative
history of the Warsaw Convention and observed that
the delegates had little trouble agreeing that liability should attach inside the terminal building in the case of goods and baggage, but there
was extensive debate on that principle as regards passengers. 0
It found that the embarking and disembarking test was susceptible to
two interpretations according to the delegates: it could be viewed in a
broad sense, in which the passenger would be covered walking from the
terminal to the plane and back again, or in a more narrow sense, in
which only the "getting on board and alightment" was covered. Moreover, it was "apparent" to the Evangelinos court that the embarking and
disembarking phrase was intended to define "geographical limits rather
than an activity." Therefore, the court determined that even under the
most expansive sense of the phrase the plaintiffs in Evangelinoswere not
within the limits of the Convention as envisioned by its draftsmen.6'
The Evaneglinos court found "great difficulty" with the District
Court decision in Day because it extended "the liability of the signatories to the Montreal Agreement under the Warsaw Convention far beyond . . .the contemplation of the parties." It criticized the "step
approach" by which Day looked to activity rather than geographic area,
noting that many of the same steps required to embark are also essential
to disembarkation and that the Day court had distinguished the disembarking cases. Approving the logic and rationale of those disembarking
cases, the Evangelinos court felt itself constrained to disagree with
62
Day.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 99 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 100.
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
396 F. Supp. at 100.
Id. at 101-102.
Id. at 102-103.
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ANALYSIS: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE RISK

Consider our two hypothetical travelers, Radar and Vector. They have
arrived at LaGuardia, obtained boarding passes and performed all other
required duties, and are currently at their gate awaiting an electronic
search. Just as their turn to go through the metal detector arrives, an
unexplained explosion takes place and they both are injured. When they
sufficiently recover, they will want to know from where they can seek
reimbursement for their injuries. There are several possible sources: the
airline, the airport, the police performing the search, and the tortfeasor
(as in the case of the terrorist). Alternatively, Radar and Vector may
have to bear the entire burden of their injuries themselves. These alternatives will be scrutinized in inverse order of their desirability.
If at all possible, Radar and Vector would like to avoid incurring the
full cost of their injuries. Society sometimes places risks of injury on the
individual without recourse to others, 3 but these cases usually involve
minimal risks which result in no great hardship to the individual. 4 Here,
by contrast, the potential damage is.very high. Most passengers do not
obtain insurance. 5 The naive passenger's expectations are that it is the
duty of either the airport or the airlines to have insurance in the event
of an accident. Only the very sophisticated air traveler will know affirmatively who bears the burden of insuring the risk.66 For these reasons, it
is highly unfair to place the burden of so high a loss on the average
passenger.
The terrorist tortfeasor may also prove to be a poor individual upon
whom to place the risk. Assuming he can be found, the likelihood of his
having insurance to cover this type of risk is low, and without it his
ability to pay a sizeable tort recovery will usually be severely limited.
63. Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corporation, 49 A.2d 81 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1946).
64. Id. at 83.
65. DRIoN, supra note 1, at 22-28; see also Mendelsohn, supra note 50.
66. Kennelly, Aviation Law: International Air Travel-A Brief Diagnosis and
Prognosis,56 CH. B. REc. 178, 180-82 (1975). The sophisticated passenger could avoid all
liability limits simply by making the ultimate destination of his journey a nation that does
not adhere to the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, if Vector's tickets read New York to
Boston to London to New York to Iran, he could avoid all liability limits. Once Vector
arrived safely back in New York he could cancel the unused portion of his ticket. Another
way in which Vector could be protected would be for him to buy two tickets, one from
New York to Boston and a second from Boston to London to New York. Since the ticket
determines whether the passenger is engaged in international travel, see Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2), Vector would not be subject to international air law limits for an accident
occurring prior to take-off at New York.

67. The terrorist stands in a position similar to that of the politically motivated hijacker. For discussions of the latter, see S. AGRAWALA, AIRcRAFr HIJACKING AND INrERNATIONAL LAW

(1973); R.

TURIE,

C.
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The problem is complicated in international travel by the difficulty of
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign national, 8 and even if jurisdiction
can be established, the subsequent problem of having to enforce a judgment abroad is immense." Therefore this person is an undesirable candidate to sue.
It is conceivable that Radar and Vector may try to sue the police who
conducted the security search, but this approach is unlikely to succeed. 0
In response to the hijacking dilemma of the 1960's there was a good deal
of legislative activity, including three international agreements7' which
place a duty on all ratifying countries to provide security of this type at
their airports. The police in carrying out this duty are therefore exercis72
ing a governmental function and are virtually immune from suit.
A third party upon whom liability for terminal incidents might be
placed is the airport owner. As in the case of the tortfeasor, there are
problems of jurisdiction and enforcement when a foreign airport is
involved. Even where the terminal is located within the United States,
there are complications presented by the fact that airport owners are
OF AIRcRAFT HIJACKING

(1972); Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done, 67 AM. J.

INT'L L. 641 (1973).

68. However, modem long-arm statutes can be extremely helpful in establishing jurisdiction. The New York statute, for example, allows state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nondomiciliaries if the person "[c]ommits a tortious act without the state causing
.injury to a person or property within the state" if the person has other economic contacts
in New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (MeKinney 1970). There is also a second jurisdictional avenue, under the old "doing business" test. Id. § 301. See Bryant v. Finnish
Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
69. For a discussion of the problems involved in suing in a foreign forum, see Davidson,
supra note 38.
70. See Abramovsky, The Constitutionalityof the Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22
BUFF. L. REv. 123 (1973); Andrews, Screening Travelers at the Airport to PreventHijackings: A New Challengefor the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine,16 Amz. L. REv. 657,
662 (1974).
71. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
opened for signature, Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (effective
Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done, Dec.
16, 1970, [19711 2 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971); Convention
to Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation, done, Sept. 23, 1971, [1973] 1
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (effective Jan. 26, 1973). See also AGRAWAA, supra note 67;
TURIE, et al., supra note 67; Denaro, In Flight Crimes, The Toyoko Convention, and
Federal Judicial Jurisdiction,35 J. AIR L. & COM. 171 (1969); Evans, supra note 67;
Fitzgerald, Recent Proposalsfor ConcertedAction Against States in Respect of Unlawful
Interference with International Civil Aviation, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 161 (1974); Franck &
Lockwood, PreliminaryThoughts Towards an InternationalConvention on Terrorism, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1974); A Symposium on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft: Approaches
to the Legal Problems, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 161 (1971).
72. See Andrews, supranote 70; 21 N.Y.L.F. 108 (1975).
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often municipal corporations whose susceptibility to suit depends upon
their articles of incorporation 7. 3 If the articles state that they are exercising a governmental function, as is the case under the Uniform Airports
Act, 74 then the passenger may not be able to sue at all.75 Nevertheless,
the airport owner should not ,be forgotten as a possible defendant; a
secondary level suit against the airport might yield some recovery where
there is an inability to prove fault or collect judgment from a more
primary source.
The primary source of liability for injuries at airport terminals has
been the air carrier, 76 but such liability has usually been restricted to
accidents occurring within those areas under the carrier's control. 77 The
carrier usually has absolute control over the areas it leases, including the
73. L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 9.01[2] (rev. ed. 1972), states:
The traditional rule has been that a municipality is immune from liability in tort
while performing a 'governmental function,' but is not . . . when acting in its
'proprietary' capacity.
See Logan, The Liability of Airport Proprietors, 1 J. Am L. & COM. 263 (1930); Marx,
Governmental Tort Liabilityfor Operationof Airports, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 173 (1959).
74. The Uniform Airports Act was withdrawn by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1943, but was enacted in several states before that time. See, e.g., GA. CODE §
11-201 et seq. (1973); LA. REV. STAT. § 2:131 et seq. (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.031 et
seq. (1965); S.C. CODE LAWS §-2-101 et seq. (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 2-2-3 et seq. (1971).
75. This is particularly true if the accident occurs in an area which the carrier leases
from the city. See Polara v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 284 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), holding
that the municipality was not liable for an injury caused by a passenger tripping over a
chain put up by the carrier lessee in a passageway; Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Dixon, 310
So.2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1975), absolving the lessor from liability for an accident which
occurred on the baggage conveyor belt behind the lessee's ticket counter. It is less clear
when the city exercises a great deal of control over a common area. See Crowell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 240 N. Car. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954), allowing the carrier to seek an indemnity against the city for an accident in a passageway the city has agreed to maintain;
Caroway v. Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952), allowing the city
to be sued for failure to warn a passenger who slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor in
a common lobby.
76. KREINDLER, supra note 73, at §§ 3.07 & 3.10[19].
77. The dividing line between lessor (airport) and lessee (airline) liability is not always
clear. For example:
The fact that an airport owner or operator may be liable and responsible for
maintaining a passageway to the terminal in good condition does not relieve the
airline of liability. The airline and the airport owner may be jointly liable for an
unsafe condition in that passageway or even at the terminal itself.
KREINDLER, supra note 73, at § 3.12[8]. See generally the cases cited in note 75 supra;
Knoxville v. Bailey, 222 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955), holding the carrier liable for an accident
occurring on the station premises but in an area over which it had no control; Gray v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 45, 46-47, 192 S.E.2d 521, 522 (1972), holding that "'[wlhere
the lessee has exclusive control of the premises, the lessor has no duty to inspect or any
liability for defective construction or installation not made under his direction,'" quoting
Horton v. Ammons, 125 Ga. App. 69, 186 S.E.2d 469 (1971).
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physical appurtenances. 7 Furthermore, the airline is best able to prevent structural defects, provide security against the tortious acts of 7third
9
parties, and obtain insurance to distribute the costs of protection.
C.

THE HYPOTHETICAL AIRLINE PASSENGERS UNDER PRESENT LAW

Assuming that Radar and Vector decide to sue the carrier, they will
want to know the likelihood of recovery. Therefore, a brief look at their
status under current law is necessary. Since Radar and Vector are in
virtually identical positions, it is important to see if they are treated
equally, thus satisfying the principle of equal protection of the laws.
Radar, a domestic passenger, must look to domestic law.' Under the
traditional United States rules, an air carrier is held only to a standard
of ordinary care as respects most air terminal accidents;"2 the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applied only to in-flight accidents. 3 This rule is
subject to an exception, however, for accidents occurring during the
time when a passenger is "boarding" or "alighting" from the aircraft. 4
78. 127 Ga. App. 45, 192 S.E.2d 521 (1972); Green v. TACA International Airlines, 304
So.2d 357, 361 (La. 1974).
79. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975); Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
69 AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1975); 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 440 (1975); 6 LAW & POLICY ININT'L Bus.
1167 (1974). The practical requirement that the carrier obtain insurance not only ensures
passenger protection, but also reduces per passenger costs by reducing administrative
costs. In addition, insurance companies are better able to gauge the collective risk of the
carrier than the individual risks of passengers. See Mendelsohn, supra note 50. Other
sources which discuss insurance aspects of the problem include DRION, supra note 1, at
20-28; Boyle, supra note 4; Caplan, Insurance, Warsaw Convention, ChangesMade Necessary by the 1966 Agreement and the Possibility of Denunciationof the Convention, 33 J.
AIR L. & COM. 663 (1967); Davis, Aviation Insurance Exclusions, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 337
(1971); Hagglund & Arthur, Coverage Problems in Aviation Insurance Policies, 23 FED.
INs. COUNS. Q. 4 (Summer 1973); Whitehead, The Role of the Insurance Company in Air
Safety, 34 J. Am L. & COM. 450 (1968). See also 23 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 65 (Fall 1972).
80. See Haskell, The Warsaw System and the United States Constitution Revisited, 39
J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 510-16 (1973).
81. The status of a passenger is determined by his flight ticket. Warsaw Convention,
art. 3. Radar should have no trouble establishing jurisdiction in New York under the longarm statute, see note 68 supra, since the accident happened there and he is a New York
resident.
82. Polara v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 284 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960); Marshall v.
United Airlines, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 84, 87, 110 Cal. Rptr. 416, 418 (1973); Delta Airlines,
Inc. v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 342, 73 S.E.2d 598, 603 (1953); Cronin v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1077, 313 N.E.2d 245, 248 (1974); Crowell v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 240 N. Car. 20, 31, 81 S.E.2d 178, 187 (1954).
83. Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (1948); Annot., 6
A.L.R.2d 528, 529-33 (1948); McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline PassengerLitigation,
37 VA. L. REv. 55 (1951).
84. Brown v. American Airlines, Inc., 244 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1957); Delta Airlines, Inc.
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Generally, these terms have been used to describe the area of the ramp
or similar device,"3 thus yielding an even more restrictive result than
that resulting from the narrow interpretation of "embarking or disembarking" under some Warsaw Convention cases."6 Under this legal regime, Radar would have to prove a violation of the duty of ordinary care
in order to recover. This task would be virtually impossible in the case
of a terrorist bombing,n but in the more common case of slip and fall
accidents negligence could be shown and, barring contributory negligence, Radar in that case would surely recover.
A growing, and perhaps majority view, is that the carrier owes a high
standard of care to the passenger throughout the entire passengercarrier relationship. 9 To determine if this relationship exists a fiveprong test" is used: (1) control of the passenger by the carrier, (2) control
of the place of the accident by the carrier, (3) an intent by the passenger
to use the conveyance, (4) that the accident take place within a reasonable time before boarding or after alighting, and (5) notice to the carrier
that the passenger intends to take passage.' In many respects this test
is similar to the tripartite test for Warsaw Convention purposes of activity, contol, and location offered by the Second Circuit in Day."2 In a
jurisdiction following the five-prong test approach, Radar's proof would
be easier, although the terrorist bombing case would still present difficult problems. Since the high standard of care pertains even to prevention of criminal acts by third parties, however, 3 Radar could conceivv. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1953); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1113 (1958).
85. Federal Ins. Co. v. Bonilla Colon, 392 F.2d 662, 665 (lst Cir. 1968); Weller v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 239 Minn. 298, 58 N.W.2d 739 (1954). Cases on carrier defenses
include Rubio v. Southern Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1021 (D.P.R. 1975) (assumption
of the risk); Honka v. Eastern Airlines; Inc., 327 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (contributory negligence).
86. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975) and

cases
87.
88.
89.

cited in note 35 supra.
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975).
See 33 J. Am L. & CoM. 171 (1967).
Suarez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 498 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 1974); Garrett v.

American Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964); Tolson v. Pan American World

Airways, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Dixon, 310 So.2d
336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1975). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 938 (1964); 33 J. AIR L. & Com. 171
(1967); 40 J. Am L. & COM. 723 (1974); 60 IowA L. REv. 710 (1975).
90. This test was first clearly articulated in Zorotovich v. Washington Toll Bridge
Authority, 80 Wash.2d 106, 491 P.2d 1295 (1971).

91. Suarez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 498 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1974).
92. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975). See note 56 supra

and accompanying text.
93. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 528
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ably win even the terrorist case.
Vector's case is more complicated. Since his flight ticket runs New
York-Boston-London-New York, he is an international passenger under
Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention. The ultimate destination of his
flight is New York, thus establishing jurisdiction within the United
States for purposes of Article 28.11 Assuming that the suit could be
brought in either the Western District of Pennsylvania or the Southern
District of New York, 5 and that Vector suffered bodily injury in an
accident within the purview of Article 17,12 the remaining questions are
the amount of damage and whether Vector was within the "course of any
of the operations of embarking."
With the Day and Evangelinos opinions as precedents in the jurisdictions we have selected, the answer to the embarking question is easy.
In the New York court Vector would clearly be considered within the
"operations of embarking" since he meets the activity, control and loca7
tion tests outlined in Day,"
and would win on the issue of carrier liability since the Montreal Agreement imposes liability without fault in
cases where the Warsaw Convention applies." However, he will be limited to a maximum of $75,000 damages under the Warsaw Convention
as modified by the Montreal Agreement, 9 even though his actual damages may exceed that amount several fold.' ®
In the Pennsylvania court, Vector would lose on the issue of liability
under the Warsaw Convention since he does not fall within the geographic limits of "embarking or disembarking" outlined in the Evangelinos decision."0 ' Thus, the Warsaw Convention would be inapplicable
10 2
and Vector would be left to his remedies under domestic law.
94. See note 40 supra. See also McCormick, Exclusive FederalJurisdictionover Aviation via International Treaties, 6 Am L. Rav. 13 (1935); 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 554
(1972). This topic is discussed in depth in part Il infra.

95. Determination of the proper United States court is, of course, a matter of domestic
law. Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975).

96. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport, 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
97. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975). See note 56 supra
and accompanying text.

98. Montreal Agreement.
99. Id.
100. One commentator has compiled a table of damage recoveries in non-Warsaw cases
which illustrates that many plaintiffs every year recover damages in excess of the $75,000
maximum allowed under the Montreal Agreement. KREINDLER, supra note 73, at §
12B.02[6].
101. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 101-102 (W.D. Pa.
1975). See also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
102. MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971).
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Essentially he would be in the same position as Radar, and could recover
damages in some jurisdictions to the full extent of his injuries.,3
The different treatment of Radar and Vector, and the differing treatment of Vector in New York and Pennsylvania, is undesirable and may
lead to forum shopping' 4 and deceptive ticketing practices by
sophisticated passengers.' 5 Moreover, the present State of the law under
the "embarking or disembarking" provision of the Warsaw Convention
leaves the passenger, and ultimately the courts, in a state of uncertainty
when a case such as Vector's arises. Therefore, the Day and Evangelinos
opinions must be examined with an eye toward resolving the conflict.
D. Day AND Evangelinos: A

CRITIQUE

An analysis of these two cases must begin with an interpretation of
the language of Article 17.100 First, the structure of Article 17 must be
examined. The words "death," "wounding" and "bodily injury" are the
first grouping and define the types of damage the Convention seeks to
cover.' °7 The word "accident" is in the next significant part of Article
17 and describes the injury-causing activity contemplated by the draftsmen. 0 8 The last phrase is "on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Clearly the words "on
board the aircraft" denote a geographic limitation. Since the phrase
"embarking or disembarking" is grouped with "on board" and is stated
as an alternative for "on board," it should also be a geographic limitation.'1 However, the words "any of the operations of.

.

." tend to make

103. This would be the result in jurisdictions which follow the "modern" approach
outlined in the cases cited in notes 90-91 supra.
104. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
105. Kennelly, supra note 66, at 178-86. See also text accompanying note 66 supra.
106. For the complete text of Article 17, see text accompanying note 30 supra.
107. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 403, 314 N.E.2d 848, 856,
385 N.Y.S.2d 97, 112 (1974). See also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport, 388 F. Supp. 1245,
1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
[A] concomitant of the purpose to limit liability was a purpose to facilitate
recovery by injured passengers .

. .

. Given the total lack of expression and the

absence of a meaningful basis for inference regarding the types of injury not
comprehended by Articles 17, 18 and 19, I conclude that causes of action based
on such types of injury should be governed exclusively by the substantive law
which would be applicable if the treaty did not exist . . . . [t]his court believes
that the purpose could more appropriately be effected by construing the types of
injury enumerated expansively to comprehend as many types of injury as possible
108. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
109. The court in the Day case seemed to recognize this fact when it made "location"
one part of its three-prong test. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.
1975).
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this connection ambiguous."' Nevertheless, for the moment the assumption will be made that, although this language renders uncertain the
meaning of the Article, it does not preclude either the Day or
Evangelinos interpretation.
The resolution of this ambiguity may be found in an examination of
the intent of the signatories as to the overall purpose of the Warsaw
Convention. The modem rationale for the Convention has been the
protection of passengers from the risks of air travel, but the traditional
reasoning behind the Convention was in large part the protection of the
airline industry."' The Montreal Agreement does show a greater sensitivity to the passengers' interests,1 12 but the fact remains that the international air carrier is the party who is ultimately benefitted by the
limitations on liability. Even if we assume that the purpose of the Convention is passenger protection, the Evangelinos reasoning, which allows
the passenger to recover in the full amount of his injuries under domestic
law,"3 may be preferable. Ultimately, the Day interpretation can be
justified only as a means of giving passengers in the particular fact
situation there presented-a terrorist raid at a foreign airport-recovery
in a local forum.
The legislative history of the Warsaw Convention and the early commentaries indicate that the Evangelinos interpretation of "embarking
or disembarking" as a geographic test is correct. In support of the opposite conclusion, the Second Circuit in Day cites the minutes of the Convention as upholding a flexible test for determining the parameters of
embarking."' Indeed there is little doubt that the draftsmen, in using
the language "in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking," intended to be flexible; the conflict lies in the type of
test envisioned in these words. Commentators contemporary with the
Convention indicated that the words were intended to refer to any intermediate stops where the passengers might be asked to temporarily leave
the plane or transfer to another craft."' This would be consistent with
110. This may arise from a problem of translating the original French text of the
Convention.
111. DRION, supra note 1, at 1-7; GOEDHUIS, supra note 4; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 120.
112. The Montreal Agreement, however, can be interpreted primarily as a stopgap
measure to protect carriers from the imminent end of the protection afforded by liability
limits due to the denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the United States.
113. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
114. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975).
115. GO.DHUiS, supra note 4, at 196. The Convention was also drafted prior to the
universal use of boarding gates and departure lounges, and airports operated various
boarding schemes. The flexibility in Article 17 may well have also been designed to cover
these various boarding procedures, and not operations within the airport. Id. at 196-97.
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the Evangelinos geographic interpretation, and in fact the commentators" 6 and cases on disembarking" 7 were unchallenged in the United
States until the Day decision."'
Not only is Evangelinos consistent with the intentions of the draftsmen and prior authority, but arguably it is preferable on another ground
as well. While the Warsaw Convention has been successful in terms of
establishing uniform ticketing procedures, limiting jurisdiction, and in
dealing with baggage claims, it has been widely criticized for not providing adequate protection for the passenger."' The original rationale for
limiting carrier liability is by and large outmoded.' 0 Moreover, it is
increasingly recognized that the Convention unfairly discriminates
against both domestic carriers not insulated by such limits and international passengers who, unlike their domestic counterparts, cannot recover to the full extent of their injuries. By taking a more restrictive view
of "embarking or disembarking," the Evangelinos court successfully
limits the application of the objectionable part of the Warsaw Convention,2 ' leaving the passenger to his remedy at domestic law. The plaintiff loses the benefit of the absolute liability provisions of the Montreal
Agreement, and is left with domestic law concepts of fault. In most
situations, although perhaps not in the Day case, 2 there will be juris116. See, e.g., GOEDHUIS, supra note 4, at 196-97; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 21.
117. These cases are cited in note 35 supra.
118. Indeed, the only prior authority supporting the Day interpretation was a German
case, Blumenfeld v. BEA, 11 Z.L.W. 78 (1972). Foreign authority, however, is far from
uniform. See Mache v. Air France, 21 Revue Francaise de Droit Aerien 345 (Cour d'appel
de Rouen 1967). The decision in Day seems to be one peculiar to its fact pattern, i.e. a
terrorist attack.
119. Abramovsky, Compensationfor Passengersof Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFF. L. REv.
339 (1972); Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 624 (1967); Mendelsohn, supra note 50; Mennell & Simone, United States
Policy and the Warsaw Convention, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 219 (1963); Parker, supra note 29;
Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 421 (1970).
120. DRIoN, supra note 1, at 12-13, lists eight factors which could serve ultimately as a
rationale for limiting liability, and finds only the policies of litigation avoidance and the
passenger insurance against the risk to be sound.
121. This technique is not unlike the public international law doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus,which renders treaties of no force and effect when the essential conditions upon
which they were based are no longer present. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27, opened for signature,May 23, 1969, art. 62, reprintedin 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) and 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 679 (1969). See Briggs, UnilateralDenunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM.
J. INT'L L. 51 (1974); Bullington, InternationalTreaties and the Clause "Rebus Sic Stantibus," 76 U. PA. L. REv. 153 (1967); Note, PresidentialAmendment and Termination of
Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 580 (1967); Editorial
Comment, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1942).
122. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
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diction in this country and the plaintiff will not be relegated to a foreign
forum. Moreover, the task of establishing breach of duty is made easier
by the modem trend of applying a high standard of care to the airline
throughout the entire passenger-carrier relationship.'23 Even the terrorist bombing situations are covered when this high standard is extended
to protect passengers against the criminal acts of third parties.
In the final analysis, neither the Second Circuit in Day nor the District Court in Evangelinos provides a satisfactory solution. In attempting to solve the problem of unfair liability limits in a treaty, a court is
really engaging in an executive function. 2 ' Ideally, the executive should
deal with this problem by excising the objectionable limitations on personal injury recovery from the Warsaw Convention. As a practical matter, however, this is unlikely since limitations on personal injury recovery are long established in the field of international air law and airlines
and manufacturers provide strong lobbies against the elimination of
such limits. An increase of such limitations is the most likely reform,
but even this will take time. Until then, the best we can hope for is that
the conflicting decisions of the Second Circuit in Day and the District
Court in Evangelinos will be resolved, ensuring adequate and equal
treatment of international passengers and their domestic law counterparts. Such an objective can be achieved by adopting the District Court
decision in Evangelinos.
III
JURISDICTION OVER A MANUFACTURER'S CONTRIBUTION
ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 28(1) OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
David H. Barnes
When an American passenger is killed or injured in the crash of an
international air carrier, Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention often
prevents the passenger or his representative' from bringing an action
against the carrier in a domestic court, even where the court would
otherwise have in personam and subject matter jurisdiction.
Suing the carrier in the foreign forums available under the Convention
123. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
124. See generally, Whitehead, Still Another View of the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AmR
L. & CoM. 651 (1967).
125. The passenger's action would be a negligence action against the carrier for his own
injuries; if the passenger dies in the accident, his representative would bring a wrongful
death action.
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may prove expensive and will often force the passenger to deal with
unfamiliar foreign law. In such a situation, a plaintiff-passenger may
forego his action against the carrier and sue the plane's manufacturer
in a domestic court. This would be a likely course of action for two
reasons: first, obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the manufacturer
will usually pose no problem since the manufacturer will often be doing
business in the state; and second, the rapid recent growth of strict
products liability will greatly increase the plaintiff's chances of success.12
The manufacturer, believing that the carrier is wholly or partially
responsible for the passenger's injury or death, could then bring an
action for contribution' 1 against the carrier in the same domestic court.
In opposition to such a suit, the carrier has an argument that, just as
Article 28(1) prevents a passenger from suing the carrier in a domestic
court, it should bar the manufacturer's attempt to utilize the same
forum.
The issue with which this section will deal is whether the domestic
court can entertain the manufacturer's action for contribution without
undermining the policies behind Article 28(1). Additional policy considerations bearing on this issue will also be discussed. Due to the increasingly mobile nature of the American populace, 2 the likelihood that this
fact situation will arise is not remote, and because of the vast sums of
money involved in litigation following aircraft disasters, the disposition
of this issue will have significant monetary consequences.
A.

THE OPERATION OF ARTICLE

28(1)

1. Article 28(1)'s Four Contacts
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention 2

1

offers the plaintiff four

126. These factors, in fact, would encourage a plaintiff-passenger or his representative
to sue the manufacturer even when he could sue the carrier in an American court.
127. Contribution among joint tortfeasors was barred at common law, see Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) and W. PROSSaR, LAW OF TORTS 305
(4th Ed. 1971), but actions for contribution are permitted by modem statutes such as N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 1401 (McKinney 1974) which reads in pertinent part: "[T]wo or more persons
who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury . . . or wrongful
death, may claim contribution among them ....
"
128. As an increasing number of international flights involve American citizens or some
contact with the United States, a better understanding of Warsaw Convention jurisdiction
is called for. See McKenry, JudicialJurisdictionUnder the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR
L. & COM. 205, 216-17 (1963).
129. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention reads:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the
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possible forums. The first available forum is the domicile of the carrier,
which has been uniformly construed to mean the carrier's place of incorporation.' 0 Secondly, an action may be brought in the jurisdiction in
which the carrier's principal place of business is located. It has been held
that a carrier has only one principal place of business in the world for
purposes of Article 28(1) forum selection.' 3' The third forum available
to the plaintiff is the carrier's place of business through which the flight
contract was made.1 3 Finally, a plaintiff-passenger may sue in a court
of the jurisdiction which is the destination of his flight. For purposes of
forum selection, such a destination has been held to be the passenger's
"ultimate" destination rather than the destination of a particular phase
of the flight.13
2.

The Policies Behind Article 28(1)

An understanding of the policies behind Article 28(1) is crucial to our
analysis. Examination of these policies shows that Article 28(1) was part
of the attempt to implement the general Convention policies of limited
carrier liability and uniformity.
The principal reason for limiting the forums available to plaintiffs was
the fear of Convention delegates that carriers would be subjected to
numerous suits in remote places,' 3 possibly in jurisdictions that would
domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place
of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the
place of destination.
This provision is from the official English translation of the official French text. For a brief
but informative treatment of the Convention's history, see C. RHYNE, AVIATION ACCIDENT
LAW 252 (1947). See also Section I.A. supra.
130. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Pardonnet v.
Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Pitman v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Pa. 1963). For a general discussion of Article 28(1)'s
four forums, see Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1272, 1275-76 (1964).
131. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809 n.9 (2d Cir. 1966); Nudo v.
SABENA, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.,
15 N.Y.2d 53, 63, 203 N.E.2d 640, 644, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1964) (Desmond, J.,
concurring); Note, Warsaw Convention-JurisdictionUnderArticle 28, 13 VA. J. INT'L L.
94, 99-100 (1972), suggesting that an airline should be deemed to have a principal place
of business in every jurisdiction in which it does business.
132. Problems of interpretation have arisen under this part of the Article when a ticket
agent other than the defendant carrier has sold the passenger his ticket. See Eck v. United
Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964); Berner v.
United Airlines, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884, aff'd without opinion 3 N.Y.2d
1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1956).
133. Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975); Felsenfeld
v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation, 234 N.Y.S.2d 351 (City Civ. Ct. Kings Co.
1962).
134. See Mankiewicz, supra note 24, at 555.
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not apply the liability limits set by the Convention.' Accordingly, Article 28(1) requires suit to be brought in the courts of a signatory nation.
A second reason for limiting the number of available forums was the
desire of parties to the Convention that suits be brought in forums
convenient for defendant carriers. If suits were permitted where carriers
usually did no business, carriers would have to deal with strange foreign
laws and incur significant travel expenses. 3 ' To prevent such inconvenience, all of the Article 28(1) forums require at least a minimal amount
of carrier presence"3 7 and the Article rejects the place of the accident as
an acceptable forum.' Finally, Article 28(1) reinforces the Convention
policy of uniformity by providing a choice of law rule which must be
applied by all countries adhering to the Convention. By limiting and
defining the forums available to plaintiffs the Article assures litigants
of a measure of predictability and certainty that would be lacking if the
plaintiff had the option of bringing suit in any forum having jurisdiction
over the carrier. The carrier thus has advance notice of the forums in
which it is amenable to suit.
3. Preclusion of Jurisdictionin the Plaintiff's Domicile
In providing a limited number of forums for an action against an
international air carrier, Article 28(1) often precludes an action in the
plaintiffs own country. The preclusive nature of Article 28(1) can best
be demonstrated by examining the hypothetical set out in the first
section of this Comment. Vector, an American citizen, buys a ticket in
Montreal for a BOAC flight from New York to London via Boston. After
the plane crashes between Boston and London, killing Vector, Vector's
spouse, also an American citizen, attempts to commence a wrongful
death action against BOAC in a domestic court. In such a case, none of
Article 28(1)'s four contacts fall within the United States. The carrier's
place of incorporation is England, the carrier's principal place of business is in England, the flight contract was made in Canada, and the
passenger's destination was England. In such situations American
courts have uniformly held that they have no jurisdiction over actions
against the carrier. 9
135. Id. at 538; Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59-60, 203 N.E.2d 640,
642, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1964).
136. Cha, supra note 4, at 60.
137. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 61, 203 N.E.2d 640, 643, 255
N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (1964).
138. Cha, supra note 4, at 60. Transcripts of Convention debates eliminating the place
of the accident as a possible forum are reprinted in Calkins, The Cause of Action Under
the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. An L. & COM. 217, 229-31 (1959).
139. Biggs v. Alitalia-Linee Aree Italiane, S. p. A., 10 Av. Cas. 18,354 (E.D.N.Y.
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The workings of Article 28(1) were recently examined and explained
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Smith v. Canadian
Pacific Airways, Ltd.10 In that case the plaintiff, an American citizen,
bought a ticket in Vancouver for a flight to Tokyo on the defendant
Canadian corporation's airline. The plane crashed and the plaintiff was
injured. His attempt to bring an action in the Southern District of New
York was thwarted even though the District Court had diversity subject
matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
carrier, who was doing business in New York. This result was mandated
because the defendant was domiciled in Canada, which was also its
principal place of business, the flight contract was made in Canada, and
the destination of the flight was Japan. Said the court:
We hold that in a Warsaw Convention case there are two levels of
judicial power that must be examined to determine whether the suit may
be maintained. The first level, on which this opinion turns, is that of
jurisdiction in the international or treaty sense under Article 28(1). The
second level involves the power of a particular United States court...
to hear a Warsaw Convention case-jurisdiction in the domestic law
sense ....

...If treaty jurisdiction under the Constitution does not lie, federal
jurisdiction ... which permits cases arising under United States treaties, clearly cannot be established."'
The Second Circuit thus saw Article 28(1) as a limitation on a court's
subject matter jurisdiction.'
In precluding a plaintiff's action in his own domicile, Article 28(1) has
indirectly served as a means of limiting the carrier's liability,1 3 since
some plaintiffs will forego an action rather than pursue it in a foreign
court. There is some evidence that this method of limiting the carrier's
liability was not intended to supplement the dollar limitation that the
1969); Varkonyi v. VARIG, 71 Misc. 2d 607, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Bowen v.
Port of New York Authority, 8 Av. Cas. 18,043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Galli v. Re-Al
Brazilian International Airlines, 29 Misc. 2d 494, 211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
McKenry, supra note 128, at 216-17.
140. 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971). For critiques of this decision, see Note, Jurisdiction
UnderArticle 28, supra note 131, at 99.
141. Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1971)
(emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 802. This is analogous to the situation where a federal court with in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant is forced to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, despite the presence of a federal question or diversity of citizenship, because

of the failure to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
143. Note, Burdell v. CanadianPacificAirlines, 63 Am. J. Nr'L L. 339, 340 (1969).
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Convention provides.' At the time of the inception of Article 28(1) it
was thought to provide benefits to passengers that would be unavailable
without the Convention, or at least to be helpful in the most typical case
where the passenger buys a round trip ticket in his own domicile.'
In sum, Article 28(1) was a part of the Warsaw Convention's attempt
to protect the young international air carrier industry. This*protection
was accomplished by insuring that actions would be brought in forums
that would put into effect the Convention's dollar limitation on the
carrier's liability and by guaranteeing suits would be brought in forums
not inconvenient to the carrier. That Article 28(1) would have the practical effect of denying some plaintiffs their day in court, thus totally
eliminating the carrier's liability, was a result neither intended nor anticipated by members of the Convention.

B.

JURISDICTION OF DoMEsTc COURTS OVER A MANUFACTURER'S

CONTRIBUTION ACTION
1.

Article 28(1) Policy Considerations

Underlying the Warsaw Convention is the idea that limitations should
be placed on the liability of international air carriers towards their passengers. Since the struggling new airline business of 1929 is now a multibillion dollar industry, many commentators believe that international
air carriers are no longer entitled to any special treatment.'46 If a domestic court adopts this approach, which involves the rejection of the entire
Convention, it will have no difficulty in entertaining a manufacturer's
contribution action so long as it has in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant carrier.
144. Parker, supra note 29, at 40; 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 285, 286 (1966); 5 TEXAS INT'L
L.F. 299, 300 (1969); 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 554, 558 (1972). Some commentators have
expressed the view that Article 28(1) allowed too many forums for suits against international air carriers. GOEDHUIS, supra note 4, at 287. But see L. KREINDLER, AiRCARFr
LrGATION 59 (3d ed. 1972): "It's no joke. All of these things are designed to hurt passengers and help airlines."
145. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 523.
146. Article 28(1) has been criticized on this ground by several authors. See, e.g.,
Lowenfeld, Some Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 3 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 50 (1969); 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 554, 558 (1972). In one case, Burdell
v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av. Cas. 18,151, revised, 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (Il, Cir.
Ct. 1968), the court found Article 28(1), as it worked in that case, unconstitutional:
The Court finds that the Warsaw Convention Treaty provisions which would
restrict the right of the plaintiffs to bring this action against defendant airline in
a duly constituted court of the United States which would otherwise have jurisdiction, are unconstitutional and therefore, unenforceable.
10 Av. Cas. at 18,160.
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Even if a domestic court rejects this "radical" approach to the Convention, however, it may still be able to entertain a manufacturer's suit
for contribution without undermining the policies behind Article 28(1).
Central to the Warsaw Convention is the idea that limitations should
be placed on the liability of international air carriers, and Article 28(1)
effectuates this policy by requiring passengers to sue in forums that will
apply the Warsaw limits. However, if the carrier is being sued by the
manufacturer for contribution it is not clear if these limits will apply,
even if the action is brought in a court of a signatory nation. The treaty
itself says nothing on this issue, a silence which is not surprising in light
of the only recent developments of contribution and strict products
liability.
If a manufacturer may recover in excess of the Warsaw limits in a
contribution suit against a carrier, the Convention policy of limiting
carrier liability may be severely undermined. A passenger, for example,
could avoid a suit against the carrier by suing the manufacturer on a
strict liability theory and recovering a judgment greatly in excess of the
Warsaw limits. The manufacturer, not being bound by these limits,
could then bring an action for contribution against the carrier and recover most of the amount originally paid to the passenger. Thus, in
effect, the carrier would be paying the passenger damages greatly in
excess of the limitations established by the Convention. Because this
result directly conflicts with the Convention's goal of limited carrier
liability, it would seem to be the better view to limit the manufacturer's
recovery to the Convention amount. If the manufacturer's recovery is so
limited, there would be no harm in allowing him to bring his contribution action in a domestic forum, in spite of the absence of Article 28(1)
contacts, since the American court would be bound to apply the Convention.
If a manufacturer's recovery against a carrier is not limited to the
Warsaw amount, however, any factor that facilitates a contribution suit
works contrary to Convention policy by subjecting the carrier to liability
in excess of the treaty limits. One major factor facilitating a contribution suit would be the provision of a domestic forum for such actions,
despite the unavailability of such a forum under Article 28(1). This
would increase the likelihood of contribution suits, and could provide
the manufacturer with a cause of action unavailable under the laws of
the forums mandated by Article 28(1).
A second major policy of Article 28(1) is that suit should be brought
in a forum that will be both convenient and fair to the carrier. Because
the carrier would be doing business in the state in question and would
be subject to jurisdiction of the domestic court on actions arising outside
the Convention, the carrier would certainly not be prejudiced if the
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manufacturer should bring his contribution action in the same domestic
forum.
Article 28(1) is also an attempt to provide a uniform method of choosing forums for Warsaw actions. If a particular domestic court were free
to entertain a manufacturer's action against a carrier in a forum not
listed in Article 28(1), the uniformity that the Article is designed to
foster would certainly be diminished. This consideration also works the
other way, however, since a denial of a domestic forum for the manufacturer may indirectly result in a similar deterioration of uniformity.
Many domestic courts may want to entertain the manufacturer's action
and yet adhere to the Convention, so it is possible that such courts
would give Article 28(1) new and varied interpretations, undermining
the uniformity the Article was designed to promote. Although this situation has not yet arisen in the context of a manufacturer's action for
contribution, courts have reacted in this manner when Article 28(1)
would prevent a passenger from suing a carrier in a court of his own
domicile. For example, reasoning backwards from their conclusion that
a passenger should be able to sue a carrier in a court of his own country
if the court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant carrier,
some authorities have suggested that a carrier may have not only a
single worldwide principal place of business, but also may have a principal place of business for Article 28(1) purposes in any country in which
it does business." 7 Others have construed the "carrier's place of business
through which the contract has been made" to include ticket sales made
by travel agents as well as by competitors of the defendant carrier.'
Difficulties have also resulted from the application of Article 28(1) to
our federal system, principal among them being the dispute as to
whether Article 28(1) is a venue or jurisdictional provision.' The above
interpretations all indicate that the decisions interpreting Article 28(1)
have been anything but uniform,' and this lack of uniformity is the
result of attempts to avoid the inequitable result of keeping a passenger
from using the courts of his domicile. It would seem that courts would
147. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 63, 203 N.E.2d 640, 644, 255
N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1964) (Desmond, J., concurring); Note, JurisdictionUnderArticle 28,
supra Note 131, at 99-100.
148. See cases cited in note 132 supra.
149. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249
(1964); Note, Suit for DamagesSuffered in InternationalFlight Requires Establishment
of "Treaty" Jurisdiction,13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 518, 527 (1972).
150. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 526; 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 554, 559
(1972). This lack of uniformity has been explained as a result of the vague and flexible
language that must necessarily be included in documents that must be translated into
many different languages. See 22 CoRNELL L.Q. 561, 565 (1937).
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be equally willing to juggle statutory language to make sure that domestic manufacturers will be able to bring their contribution actions in
domestic forums.
In summary, it would not violate the policies behind the Article to
permit a manufacturer to bring a contribution suit against the carrier
in a domestic forum, provided the court has in personam jurisdiction
over the carrier. If the manufacturer could not recover in excess of the
limits set by the Convention, the carrier's limited liability would remain
unaffected. Since the court already has in personam jurisdiction over
the carrier, furthermore, the defendant airline can hardly criticize the
forum as being inconvenient or unfair. While entertaining such an action may decrease uniformity, failure to make such a forum available
may lead in the same direction. In such a situation, the uniformity the
Convention's draftsmen desired can be obtained only by amending Article 28(1) to include the manufacturer's domicile as an acceptable forum.
2. Other Considerations
The most persuasive argument for denying the manufacturer access
to a domestic forum when such a forum is not warranted by Article 28(1)
is that by entertaining such an action the court would be violating an
American treaty obligation. Under the Constitution 5 ' the Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the land and courts, both state and federal, must implement its provisions." 2 Furthermore, as one writer has
said:
...Public Policy of a state will not interfere with the enforcement of
treaty provisions. The public policy of a state is, of course, subordinate
to the requirements of the Constitution, so in the enforcement of treaty
provisions no questions arise in this regard.153
151. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.

152. Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971); Orr,
The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REV. 423, 435 (1945). For the view that parts of the
Convention are subordinate to, and in violation of, the Constitution, see Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av. Cas. 18,151, revised, 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
1968). For an extensive treatment of this viewpoint, see generally W. CowLEs, TREATMs
AND CONsTrnrrIONAL LAw: PROPERTY INTEREREN ES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAw (1941). For
criticism of the Burdell approach, see Hay, Comments on Burdell v. CanadianPacific
Airlines and the Constitutionalityof the Warsaw Convention, 58 ILL. B.J. 26,34-35 (1969);
Lowenfeld, supra note 146; 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 339 (1969); 5 TExAs INT'L L.F. 299 (1969).
153. Orr, supra note 152, at 436. In support of this statement the author cited United
State v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1936):

We do not pause to inquire whether there was any policy of the State of New York
to be infringed, since we are of opinion that no state policy can prevail against
the international compact here involved.
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Thus, it can be argued forcefully that a court should give Article 28(1)
its literal interpretation, regardless of policy reasons or other considerations that would call for the court to entertain the manufacturer's action.
A manufacturer who is denied a domestic forum for his contribution
suit may find it inconvenient or impossible to bring such an action in
one of Article 28(1)'s foreign forums. First, the manufacturer who is
unable to sue in his own country will have to incur the expense of
traveling to, and residing in, the foreign jurisdiction called for by Article
28(1). Second, if he is forced to sue abroad, the manufacturer's fate will
be determined by law unfamiliar to the manufacturer and his attorney.'54 The laws of the available foreign forums may in fact bar contribution actions altogether. Third, forcing the manufacturer to bring suit in
a jurisdiction distant from his place of business may create problems of
proof for the parties to the action. For instance, if the manufacturer's
manufacturing techniques are in issue, as they may very well be in a
negligence action, the time and expense involved in collecting relevant
evidence will increase as the litigation moves further from the manufacturer's place of business.
The preclusive nature of Article 28(1) is in sharp contrast to the broad
scope of jurisdiction exercised by American courts. Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and federal courts can
generally entertain actions involving persons and associations who do
business within the state, at least with regard to claims related to the
in-state activity.'55 Any airline flying to and from the United States
clearly does business at the place of the American airport, and therefore
any case involving such a trip could be litigated somewhere in the
United States, regardless of the final destination and the place of accident. 5' For example, under New York's "doing business" test, 7 a carrier's use of Kennedy Airport or any office in New York would be enough
in-state activity to give the New York federal and state courts jurisdiction regardless of whether the ticket was purchased in New York or
whether the claim arose from in-state activity. 5 Under New York's
154. McKenry, supra note 128, at 229; 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 554, 559 (1972). The
unfamiliarity may extend to procedural law as well as substantive law. According to
Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention, a court hearing a Warsaw case will follow its own
procedure.
155. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
156. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 576.
157. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 (McKinney 1963).
158. Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d
625 (1965).
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"transacting business" test, 59' the New York courts may have jurisdiction over claims related to in-state activity even when the carrier has
neither flights to, nor offices in, New York.' 9 Under these principles it
is obvious that a court of a state such as New York would be able to
entertain a manufacturer's contribution action if it were not for Article
28(1). The existence of such a conflict not only casts doubt on the jurisdictional bases of Article 28(1), but may also lead domestic courts to
ignore or manipulate the Article, thus undermining the uniformity the
Convention was designed to promote.
Strong support for the position that a domestic court with in personam jurisdiction over the carrier should be able to entertain a manufacturer's action for contribution against the carrier, despite the absence
of Article 28(1) contacts, may be found in the recent, but as yet unenacted, Guatemala City proposal to amend Article 28(1).111 This proposal
would permit actions to be brought in the courts of a signatory nation
which is the domicile or permanent residence of a passenger, if the
carrier has a place of business within the same jurisdiction." 2 In effect,
this proposal is saying that courts within the domicile of a plaintiff are
acceptable forums as long as the plaintiff's country adheres to the Convention and the defendant carrier is doing business within that
country.' 3 An American manufacturer's contribution suit would meet
these two conditions, and thus an American court following this most
recent thinking on the subject should entertain the manufacturer's action.
If a manufacturer seeking contribution from a carrier is denied a
domestic forum, this works contrary to the policies which lie behind
contribution. The law of the available foreign forums or the practical
difficulties of suing abroad may effectively deny the manufacturer the
opportunity to seek contribution and thus force him to shoulder all of
159. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1963).
160. Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., S.A. 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Gordon
v. Branniff Airways, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 125, 284 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
161. The Guatemala Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971), reprintedin 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
613 (1971). For a brief history of the proposal, see notes 23-24 supra and accompanying
text. An explanation of the American position at Guatemala may be found in Varkonyi
v. VARIG, 71 Misc. 2d 607, 611, 336 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The official text
of the Protocol reads in part as follows:
[An action for damages] may be brought ... in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, before the court within the jurisdiction of which the carrier
has an establishment if the passenger has his domicile or permanent residence in
the territory of the same High Contracting Party.
162. See Note, Suit for Damages Suffered in InternationalFlight Requires Establishment of "Treaty" Jurisdiction,supra note 149, at 524.
163. Id.
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any recovery a passenger might secure, despite the fact that the carrier
may have been solely or partially responsible for the passenger's injury
or death. This result directly conflicts with the policies behind contribution; the loss is not shared by the wrongdoers according to their relative
fault. " 4 Instead, loss allocation is often dependent on where the plaintiff
purchased his ticket, or other chance factors. "' A less shocking, but still
inequitable, allocation of the burden would occur if a manufacturer wins
his action in a foreign forum only to find that his recovery is significantly
diminished by expenses that he would not have incurred had he been
able to bring his action in a domestic court. The same problem would
result if the manufacturer were forced to bring his action in a foreign
court which barred recoveries over a certain amount. In both of these
situations the manufacturer may be bearing a disproportionately large
share of the burden. In addition, if American courts allowed the passenger to sue the manufacturer in a domestic forum and forced the manufacturer to sue the carrier abroad, they would run counter to judicial
economy interests of settling all matters arising out of the same transaction in one proceeding. Finally, giving the carrier effective immunity
from suits by both the passenger and the manufacturer undermines the
deterrence rationale behind contribution law. A failure to place the loss
on a party having the ability to both spread the loss over a large segment
of society and to obtain insurance against such accidents would be a
violation of traditional tort policies." 6
In summary, it appears that domestic courts should allow an airplane
manufacturer to maintain a contribution suit against an international
air carrier if the former is held liable to a passenger injured on an
international flight. This undermines neither the policies of the Warsaw
Convention itself nor those of Article 28(1). Balanced against these policy arguments, moreover, is the stronger argument that Article 28(1) is
a treaty obligation imposed on all domestic courts by the Constitution,
to which these forums must adhere in all circumstances." Thus, while
it is clear on policy grounds that the law should be changed to permit
manufacturers' contribution suits in domestic forums, this change
164. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 391-92 (1972).
165. Psossan, supra note 127, at 307.
166. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 388 (1972).
167. See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra. For views of courts faced with a conflict
between a statute's policy and its literal interpretation, see Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d
608, 623 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring); Matter of Capone v. Weaver, 6 N.Y.2d 307,
309, 160 N.E.2d 602, 603, 189 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (1959); Matter of River Brand Rice Mills
v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 43-44, 110 N.E.2d 545, 548-49 (1953).
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should be accomplished by amendment to, or withdrawal from,'6
Warsaw Convention, and not by judicial fiat.

8

the

IV
REALIGNING AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
Thomas D. Myers
Whatever the virtues of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague and
Montreal amendments, they could hardly be termed the allies of aircraft
manufacturers. These manufacturers, along with component parts makers, are part of a highly regulated industry with unique legal problems.
Their products traverse domestic and international boundaries, simultaneously transporting persons from literally dozens of jurisdictions. An
accident involving such a product presents obvious litigation problems.
Two of the most serious dilemmas plaguing aircraft manufacturers are
(1) the agreements' discriminatory liability limits, which insulate air
carriers from heavy damages and thereby shift the major burden to the
manufacturers, and (2) the difficulty of sustaining third-party contribution or indemnity claims in litigation based on strict products liability.' 9 The scope of the problem appears to be increasing in geometric
proportions. Jet travel is reaching nations never before served, and the
size of the modem "jumbos" unfortunately forbodes disasters involving
hundreds of people.'70
Previous sections of this Comment have dealt with the relatively technical questions of when Warsaw consequences attach and where jurisdiction of possible contribution actions may lie. This section will deal
168. Denouncing the Warsaw Convention, the United States came very close to withdrawal in 1965 but then withdrew the statement when the Montreal Agreement became
imminent. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
169. One of the central queries of this section is whether aircraft manufacturers, if sued
by an injured passenger on a theory of strict products liability, should be entitled to
indemnity or contribution against third-party purchasers or users. Traditionally, courts
have held in the negative. Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958);
Schipper v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 278 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maryland v.
Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries,
Inc., 17 ll. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974); Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App.
3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973).
Some evidence exists, however, that the trend may be reversing. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 385 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Goldstein v. Compudyne Corp., 262 F.
Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
170. The crash of a Turkish Airlines DC-10 outside Paris on March 3, 1974, for example,
claimed the lives of all 346 passengers and crew on board. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1974, at 1,
col. 8.
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with the broader issue of what can be done to counteract the discriminatory effect of the Warsaw Convention and its progeny, which place the
airlines in a sheltered position and expose the manufacturers to unparalleled liability.
A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

At the time the Warsaw scheme was conceived, common law requirements of privity of contract usually barred passengers from recovering
damages directly from the aircraft manufacturer.' One result, as we
have seen, 7 was that manufacturers went unrepresented in Warsaw.
Subsequent debate engaged airline, passenger and government alike in
a search for liability dollar figures that reflected the economic realities
of the 1960's and 1970's. 73 In the nearly fifty years since Warsaw, however, three significant changes in American jurisprudence have occurred
which suggest that the debate over dollar limitations may no longer be
Warsaw's greatest problem.
First, the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act 17 1 has made it possible for plaintiff passengers to sue and recover from the United States
Government for the negligence of Air Traffic Controllers when such
negligence is a contributing factor in an air crash. Second, the common
law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors' 5 has been
substantially modified, 76 creating complex legal problems as to shared
liability between air carrier, government, and aircraft manufacturer.
Third, and certainly most significant, has been the evolution of an entirely new branch of law-strict products liability. Essentially, it is the
arrival of this principle, unknown and unforeseen forty years ago, that
has placed aircraft manufacturers, parts manufacturers and others
77
down the line of production in a delicate and vulnerable position.
171. The "privity of contract" requirements first enunciated in Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842), formed a cornerstone of Ameri-

can tort law that remained well preserved for nearly one hundred years.
172. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
173. For a history of the amendments to the Warsaw Convention raising its liability
limitations, see section I.B.-D. supra.
174. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
175. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See generally Boblen,
Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936); Leflar,
Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
176. Most modification has been by state statutes, enacted in most jurisdictions, which
permit contribution. See, e.g., the New York statute cited in note 127 supra. The statutes
are described in W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs 307-10 (4th ed. 1971).
177. The strict products liability doctrine is only the present "phase" of an evolution
in tort law. Under the common law, injury was usually borne by the one suffering it unless
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Strict products liability wields the constant threat that the manufacturer will be held liable for huge sums above the treaty limitations even
under circumstances where his negligence is concededly small in relation to that of the air carrier. 7 '
A manufacturer's responsibility may encompass the defective work of
the thousands of component parts makers from whom he purchases
equipment.'79 It may include the duty to "redesign" long after parts or
aircraft have been on the market,' and may even extend to a "duty to
special reason could be found for shifting the burden. A policy justification was advanced
in favor of encouraging industrial development. With the doctrine of negligence came
standards of "due care," "reasonableness," and the development of a contractual relationship between buyers and sellers. Warranty law carried this a step further, negating the
"fault" concept and relying instead upon a pure contractual relationship, express or
implied. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315. More recently, strict liability has
placed more stringent demands on manufacturers to ensure that their products are not
"unreasonably dangerous" (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d
897 (1962)), or "defective" (Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191

N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963)). See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A

(1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
As the title "strict liability" suggests, the effect of this doctrine has been to preclude
quantifying negligence between joint tortfeasors and hence substantially to prohibit contribution or indemnity. Have we come full cycle back to Merryweather v. Nixan? See note
206 infra and accompanying text.
178. This is the essence of the indemnity and contribution arguments taken up below.
Without some apportionment of damages an aircraft manufacturer, perhaps only five
percent negligent in a particular accident, could be held liable for unlimited damages
while the third-party air carrier, hypothetically ninety-five percent negligent, might well
enjoy the benefits of treaty protection. For an exception to this rule, see Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention, on willful misconduct.
179. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1964), an implied warranty of fitness was found to run to and in favor of
the plaintiff passenger against the defendant manufacturer, but not against the component parts maker for a defective altimeter. In Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1961), an aircraft manufacturer was found liable (1) for buying and installing a
defective component part from a third party, and (2) for its own negligence in installing
a defective component or failing to warn of known defects.
180. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 359 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1966).
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warn" purchasers of operating limitations years after the initial sale.''
Thus, our hypothetical Radars and Vectors are no longer limited to suits
solely against the air carrier. Even a slight suspicion of negligence or the
possibility of a strict liability claim will mean that modem plaintiffs will
join aircraft manufacturers and component parts makers as defendants.
Consider the impact of these developments when applied to our hypothetical-the crash of a modem day jumbo jet carrying upwards of 350
people.' 2 An accident between Boston and London would fall within the
purview of the Montreal Agreement, limiting the air carrier's possible
liability to a maximum $75,000 per person or a total of $26,250,000, only
slightly more than the cost of the aircraft.' If the hypothetical fatal
flight had no "contact" with the United States, passengers could well
be limited under the Hague Protocol to a maximum $16,582 each
against the air carrier, or even as little as $8,291 under the original
Warsaw guidelines. Given these recovery limitations, plaintiffs might
well turn to aircraft manufacturers for additional compensation. It is
not unrealistic to predict that each passenger could be awarded a
substantial verdict in the $500,000 to $1,000,000 range. This would
place a potential burden on the aircraft manufacturers for the balance
-$105,000,000 to $300,000,000 for a single crash. Needless to say,
none of the major manufacturers are in a position to afford such a
disaster." 4
The problem extends well beyond the ongoing rift between manufacturer and air carrier. The Government may also be liable for the negligence of Air Traffic Controllers."" Component parts manufacturers, the
general aviation community, competing bus, rail, and sea-going lines,
and even sister domestic airlines are also unable to claim protection
such as that the Warsaw Convention offers international air carriers.
181. In Tayam v. Executive Aero, Inc., 166 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 1969), Mooney Aircraft
Co.'s negligent failure to warn of operating procedures reasonably held to be within the
contemplation of the manufacturer constituted a breach of duty-even five years after the
sale of the aircraft.
182. The hypothetical is set forth in full in section I.D. supra.
183. On November 12, 1975, a DC-10 was destroyed as the result of bird strikes and
the ensuing fire while on take-off at Kennedy Airport in New York. The loss was reported
at $20 million. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1975, at 82, col. 1.
184. Boeing Aircraft Corporation, for example, reported net earnings in 1974 of $72.4
million. BOEING AIRCRAFr CORP., 1974 ANNUAL REPORT. Lockheed Aircraft reported net
earnings over the same period of $23.2 million. LOCKHEED AIRcRAFr CORP., 1974 ANNUAL
REPORT. The financial portrait of foreign international air carriers is considerably worse.
During the late 1960's, as many as one out of four were reported operating at a net loss.
Stephens, The Montreal Conference and InternationalAviation Liability Limitations, 33
J. AIR L. & COM. 554, 580 (1967).
185. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
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Finally, there are more than 40,000 component parts manufacturers and
companies in aviation-related industries which, like the "end manufacturer," could be held liable under strict liability without the protection
of Warsaw.16

Not only are the ultimate risks very high, but manufacturers complain that they are "easy" targets. In air crash litigation, contributory
negligence by a passenger plaintiff is unusual.' 7 Res ipsa loquiturthus
becomes an attractive alternative, shifting the burden of proof to defendant manufacturer and air carrier.'
B.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

1. Raising Warsaw Liability Limitations
One obvious suggestion for bringing the liability of aircraft manufacturers and component parts makers more in line with that of the air
carriers has been to raise the maximum liability of the carriers. From
the point of view of the manufacturers, this move would be analogous
to raising the "deductible" payment on an insurance policy. Manufac186. One commentator has written:
[Tihere are approximately 40,000 manufacturers and component-part makers
involved in the production of aircraft. Each of these aircraft manufacturers and
makers of component parts is liable without any limitation whatever in the event
it breaches its duty of "strict liability," which renders a manufacturer liable even
though the manufacturer exercised "reasonable care" in the design and manufacture of the aircraft and parts.
Kennelly, Aviation Accidents, 18 Ta. LAwYER's GUIDE 158, 167 (1974).
187. The Warsaw Convention explicitly provides for cases in which contributory negligence may be a factor:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of the injured person the Court may, in accordance with the provisions
of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.
Warsaw Convention, art. 21.
188. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is ideally suited for the passenger plaintiff who
boards an aircraft, takes his assigned seat, obeys the seatbelt and no smoking signs, and
is subsequently injured. First announced in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep.
299 (Exch. 1863), the doctrine normally involves three essential elements: (1) the act or
event must be of such a nature that it would not normally happen without someone's
negligence; (2) it must not be caused by any instrumentality within the claimant's control;
(3) there must not have been any contributory act or negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
See Maloney, Current Trends in Aviation Products Liability Law, 1971 INs. L.J. 53. To
explore the effect that the Dole doctrine (see notes 226-32 infra and accompanying text)
has had on res ipsa loquitur, see DeWitt Properties Associates, Inc. v. City of New York,
47 App. Div. 2d 300, 366 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975). One expert adds that in the unusual, but
not unknown, cases of in-flight structural failure, especially where unusual turbulence,
maneuvering or loading is not involved, the summary judgment procedure should be
encouraged. Kennelly, supra note 186, at 218.

Cornell International Law Journal

[Vol. 9:251

turers might still be liable for substantially more than the carriers in the
case of a mass disaster, but a $100,000 or $150,000 carrier liability would
protect manufacturers against a considerable volume of crash litigation.
Although not all losses are initially absorbed by air carriers, this policy
would reduce a manufacturer's liability where guilt is shared.," Both
United States airlines and their Western European competitors have
witnessed a significant increase in the amounts recovered in personal
injury and wrongful death actions. 9 ' The overall safety record of the
major carriers has made insurance available to them at considerably
lower rates than in previous years, and thus they are better prepared to
shoulder an increased potential liability without directly increasing
their operational costs.
On the other hand, too many factors suggest that an increase of liability limitations alone would not be a satisfactory solution. The most
significant criticism is that this apprach would fail to address the fundamental problem that one sector of the aviation community, the international air carrier, is artificially insulated from potential large-scale liability. ' In addition, a uniform increasing of liability limitations would
ignore the very dramatic discrepancies in living standards between signatories of the Warsaw, Hague and Montreal agreements. The effect
would be to discourage states where recoveries rarely reach these limits
from participating in these international agreements. Increased limitations, furthermore, may be relevant only to that fraction of the world's
population which travels internationally by air-those who arguably
need coverage in excess of $75,000. Poorer air passengers should not be
made to pay the price of satisfying the products liability problem. As
189. Representatives of the International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.), meet-

ing in Guatemala, recently recommended important modifications to the Montreal Agreement. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. The proposed Guatemala Protocol
would create an "absolute liability" on the air carrier of $100,000 with the exception of
cases involving contributory negligence. Beyond the $100,000, it is suggested that separate

"national systems" provide additional compensation under special circumstances.
At least two major problems are evident in such a proposal: (1) it continues the discriminatory practice of protecting air carriers from large verdicts while manufacturers, the

general aviation public, and other members of a larger aviation community bear the risks,
and (2) it ignores important constitutional questions. See note 191 infra.
The Guatemala proposal has received a cool reception in the Congress and appears
permanently tabled.
190. See note 100 supra.
191. Recently, plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of limiting, by treaty or
statute, an individual's fair recovery in personal injury and wrongful death actions. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d
865 (5th Cir. 1970). On the validity of this argument as it relates to the Warsaw Convention, see Engstrom, The Constitution and the Warsaw Convention-Are They
Reconcilable?, 6 THE FORUM (ABA) 25, 32-37 (1970).
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one commentator has said, "not everywhere should peasants have to pay
for the King's dinner."' 9 2 Finally, this solution would have a direct impact upon raising the cost of insurance and passenger fares.
In short, changing the liability structure for air carriers to effect some
relief for manufacturers would be a rather indirect and inefficient solution. It would ignore the current problem of disparate treatment, discourage participation in international conventions, and benefit only a
few individuals while forcing thousands to pay higher fares.
2. Parallel Limitations for Aircraft Manufacturers
A second alternative to the aviation industry's liability dilemma lies
in a proposal to establish liability limitations for the aircraft manufacturer similar to those presently covering air carriers.' 3 This option would
remedy many of the shortcomings of the preceding proposal, but would
fail to adequately safeguard passenger interests. This conclusion can be
seen if the proposal is analyzed in light of the four policy considerations
essential to any acceptable solution: (1) equity in risk distribution, (2)
freedom from unusual economic hardship, (3) fairness of recovery to
passengers and related constitutional questions, and (4) uniformity of
recovery for domestic and international travelers similarly situated.
Consider each of these policy'elements in turn. Under the first, it is
clear that a $75,000 liability limitation for manufacturers would redress
the inequities of risk-bearing between airlines and manufacturers, 94' but
the proposal fails to look beyond the narrow manufacturer-air carrier
conflict. Component parts manufacturers and the federal government,
both of whom might also be liable, 95 deserve and will probably demand
similar protection. Limitations, if they are to exist at all, must be designed to offer uniform security to all targets of aviation crash litigation.
The second policy element concerns relief of the various parties from
undue hardships. The proposal of establishing liability limitations for
manufacturers also encounters difficulty under this branch of the analysis. An effective argument can be made that the manufacturer, like the
air carrier, faces unique risks in marketing today's jumbo jets. 99
192. 33 J. Aix L. & CoN. 542, 546 (1967) (remarks of R.H. Mankiewicz, during special
discussion session on the Montreal Agreement).
193. A program initially articulated by aircraft manufacturers, this proposal has experienced considerable disfavor as a result of its limited scope.
194. This inequity is described in notes 177-84 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 185-86 supra and accompanying text.
196. The threat of mass disaster, see, e.g., note 170 supra,poses a unique transportation
industry problem. For estimates of the possible liability from a single crash, see note 184
supra and Kennelly, supra note 13, at 168.
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Warsaw-type limitations, at best, could reduce only a fraction of their
potential liability, since the presence of large aircraft on domestic "nonWarsaw" routes is as commonplace as on the international runs." 7 The
most serious objections to this proposal stem from the third and fourth
policy concerns. Studies prepared in advance of the Guatemala convention of 1971111 indicate that recoveries for wrongful death in non-Warsaw
cases were averaging well in excess of $100,000; 1" if there were a limitation on the amount a plaintiff might recover from the manufacturer as
well as the air carrier, there would be a total destruction of any uniform
treatment of national and international air passengers such as Radar
and Vector in our hypothetical. Such discrimination is without foundation unless the risks of domestic air travel can be shown to be appreciably greater than those of international flight. In addition, any new limitations at this moment would come at a time when the right to restrict
recovery in wrongful death actions is under constitutional attack.tm
3.

EliminatingAll Liability Limitations

Perhaps the most attractive solution would be the elimination of all
liability limitations.2" This proposal would clearly offer the cleanest and
most thorough solution to the aircraft manufacturers' principal dilemma-the problem of discriminatory protection-and would promise
a suitable balance of passenger, air carrier, and manufacturer interests.
Critics of this suggestion have argued that an elimination of liability
limitations would portend a return to protracted and expensive litigation by reducing the air carrier's incentive to settle before trial. 221 In all
likelihood the volume of litigation would indeed reflect a modest upturn,
but the costs involved surely would be outdistanced by the merits of a
"free market ' liability system.
Apart from this criticism, the proposal has several distinct advantages, not the least of which would be removal of the artificial insulation
197. The routes with which these "heavy" jets (Lockheed L-1011, Douglas DC-10 and
Boeing 747) are associated have little to do with international boundaries. They are pri-

marily assigned to high density runs and are as likely to be used in the "Northeast
corridor" as on transatlantic flights.
198. This convention drafted the Guatemala Protocol. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
199. See note 100 supra.
200. See note 191 supra.
201. Kennelly, supra note 13, at 158; Kreindler, The Guatemala Protocol, 6 AKRON L.
REV. 131 (1973); Kreindler, Warsaw Convention Symposium, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 542, 55152 (1967); Editorial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1965, at 30, col. 2.
202. DoON, supra note 1, at 37-40; Boyle, A Response to Lee Kreindler,6 AKRON L. REV.
141, 142 (1973).
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currently protecting one branch of the industry. Not only would manufacturers be brought to an even par with air carriers, but component
parts makers, the federal government, and the dozens of competing
transportation facilities and domestic airlines who face similar risks
would be equally treated. Such a radical departure from the Warsaw
line of aviation agreements need not jeopardize the valuable baggage,
ticketing and jurisdictional contributions made by the agreements.
Whether or not this major policy shift is forthcoming will depend on
additional political and practical considerations. The United States has
played the dominant role in finalizing each of the international aviation
agreements of import today. A diplomatic finesse of no small magnitude
would be required to return this country to a free market liability system, and the move would fly in the face of the worldwide trend toward
state ownership and management of air travel."0 3
If and when such a necessary move occurs, its success will depend
largely on the manufacturers' ability to shift liability freely by means
of contribution or indemnity, when appropriate, onto the principal tortfeasor. This may be the manufacturers' most serious dilemma.
C.

CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

The old tort maxim "no contribution among joint tortfeasors,"20 4
which has lately fallen into disrepute," 5 has retained its punch in plaguing aircraft manufacturers. Manufacturers who place a defective product in the stream of commerce have been barred from contribution or
indemnity against purchasers or users whose concurrent negligence may
have played a significant role in creating the cause of action.0 6 Establishing a basis for the manufacturers' right to indemnity or contribution,
therefore, is the essence of the solution to our problem.
Several different criteria are commonly used to determine the applicability of contribution or indemnity in negligence litigation, and most
203. WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY 165-77 (Dean ed. Winter 1971-72).
204. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) was the case through
which this doctrine was first enunciated. See note 175 supra. Its underlying rationale is
that no relief should be granted a joint tortfeasor when the injury for which the relief is
asked arose from his own negligence.
205. The "no contribution" rule has been mitigated substantially with the passage of
comparative negligence statutes in many states. As one commentator has said, "[t]here
is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of loss, for
which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one
alone . . . while the other goes scot free . . . ." PROSSER, supra note 127, at 307.
206. Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958); Schipper v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 278 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280
F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see also Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 950-53 (1969).
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of these have found relevance with respect to products liability cases as
well. The "active-passive" negligence test which allows a "passively
negligent" tortfeasor to recover indemnity from an "actively negligent"
tortfeasor0 ' is finding wide-spread application in products liability. '
Similarly, the existence of a duty owed by one joint tortfeasor to another," 9 the indemnitee's possible liability to third persons, ' and the
constructive, derivative or vicarious nature of this liability'" all may
influence the court in assessing the applicability of contribution or indemnity.
The straight "active-passive" negligence test has received explicit
endorsement in nearly a dozen states and the District of Columbia,'
but the extent to which those states are or will be willing to apply an
analogous active-passive test to strict products liability situations remains in issue. Obviously, a fundamental incongruity exists between the
two situations. While the active-passive test normally turns upon quantitative degrees of negligence, the strict products liability analysis
hinges upon an absolute duty or level of performance. The two need not
be mutually exclusive, however, as an examination of a number of recent cases will demonstrate. There has been considerable change in this
field, and the jurisdictions are by no means in agreement on the question. Many courts have been willing to listen to novel argument.
A few states have adopted very rigid rules negating any active-passive
negligence test. In McClish v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works,"t 3 for
example, a Federal District Court in Indiana reaffirmed a longstanding
207. The "active-passive" negligence test permits indemnity by one joint tortfeasor
against another where the former party establishes that the latter was the actual agency
through which the injury was sustained. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630
(1967); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974).
For a discussion of the law in the individual states, see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 950-53
(1969).
208. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Cas. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.
1960); Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 55 Ill.2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Lewis v.
Amchen Products, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d
943, 950-53 (1969).
209. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Carborundom Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973); see also
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 953-54 (1969).
210. See, e.g., Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 352 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1961);
Roughan v. Boston & L. Block Co., 161 Mass. 24, 36 N.E. 461 (1894); see also Annot., 28
A.L.R.3d 943, 955-57 (1969).
211. See, e.g., Pelkey v. State Sales, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Cohen
v. Wasserman, 28 Misc. 2d 58, 208 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see also Annot., 28
A.L.R.3d 943, 954-55 (1969).
212. These states include Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon and Texas. Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943, 950 (1969).
213. 266 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
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holding that "any distinction between 'active' and 'passive' negligence
."" The right of indemnity was
*.".
has been specifically repudiated .
denied in the absence of an express or implied contract right, with the
lone exception of indemnity for one whose liability to another party was
either constructive or derivative. 21 Other courts, while holding that recovery is available to a passively negligent manufacturer against an
actively negligent seller or user, have established strict criteria for bringing such third-party claims. In Scala v. American Laundry,26 a New
York court held a third-party complaint for indemnity properly dismissed solely because the original complaint charged the manufacturers
with active negligence. More recently, this very restrictive view has been
qualified in favor of the manufacturer." 7 Other states, while accepting
the active-passive doctrine, make additional provisions for joint tortfeasors in pari delicto, denying to both 1any right to indemnity but leaving
2
open the possibility of contribution. 1
A considerable number of decisions have been handed down in a
variety of jurisdictions to confirm the now well-established activepassive negligence philosophy. In the Federal District Courts," 9 Federal
Courts of Appeals,20 and most recently in the state courts, 221 decisions
have reiterated the contention that the creation of a defect in the process
of manufacture necessarily implies "active" negligence which bars indemnity actions against third-party dealers or users. The fact that a
manufacturer is held liable under a strict products liability formula
implies that some "guilt" has been established against him; the fact
that the court does not label this "fault" or "negligence" in certain
instances should be immaterial. By analogy, there is little reason why
we should not compare the "guilt" of manufacturers with that of air
carriers or subsequent users even if one is based on strict liability and
the other on negligence.
This analysis is supported by at least two decisions. In the 1969 deci214. Id. at 991. The quotation was taken from Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Jones,
220 Ind. 139, 41 N.E.2d 361 (1942).
215. McClish v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 266 F. Supp. 987, 991 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
216. 233 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
217. In Campbell v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 344, 212 N.E.2d 512
(1965), the active or passive negligence of the plaintiff was held to be a factual question
for the jury and hence the third-party complaint for indemnity was not dismissable on
motion.
218. Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972).
219. Schipper v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 278 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maryland
v. Capital Air Lines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
220. Orlove v. Philippine Airlines, 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958).
221. Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974);
Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973).
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sion of Lopez v. Brackett Stripping Co., 2 an Illinois Federal District
Court reiterated the position that indemnity would be denied manufacturers whose alleged wrongdoing constituted "active" negligence but
attempted to equate the manufacturer's strict liability for marketing a
defective book trimming machine and his active negligence in doing so.
The court found that a judgment based on strict liability would "necessarily be a finding that [the manufacturer's] product was defective
when it left its control" and therefore could not "characterize a judgment of that kind as a finding of only passive, secondary or merely
technical negligence so as to allow an action for indemnity ..
."23 The
clear implication is that such liability is tantamount, for purposes of
contribution or indemnity, to an act of active negligence. Even more
persuasive is the 1966 decision in the Southern District of New York in
Goldstein v. Compudyne Corp.21 In that opinion, Judge MacMahon
pointed out that the defendant manufacturer would be entitled to indemnity under New York substantive law if it could demonstrate that,
despite the defective condition of manufacturer's product at the time of
sale, the third-party employer-purchaser knew of the defect, disregarded
it, and used the instrument in spite of the known danger. In a subsequent case citing Goldstein, an Illinois federal court noted that "it is
clear to the Court that the fact that a manufacturer is sued on theory
of strict liability for a defective product does not preclude a third-party
action against plaintiff's employer ....
"I
A small revolution occurred at the state level when the New York
Court of Appeals handed down its 1972 decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 22 1 Realizing the practical difficulties in measuring "degree[s] of
differential culpability""' and cognizant of mounting criticism of the
active-passive basis of apportioning liability between defendants, the
court abandoned the doctrine completely."8 Subsequent decisions were
222. 303 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
223. Id. at 670.
224. 45 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
225. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 385 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In distinguishing Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973), the court

in Kuziw noted that its case involved a situation where the third-party defendants,
through alterations, had "actively" created a defective baling machine. Hence, without
particular deference to the doctrine of strict liability, the court sought to place liability
on the party who created the "putatively dangerous condition which [was] the sole
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." 385 F. Supp. at 830.
226. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
227. Id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
228. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. The court also noted that
the question of apportioning responsibility is one of fact. The New York State legislature
has recently codified the rule of Dole in the following provision:
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quick to cite Dole, testing the limitations of the court's ruling. In Walsh
v. FordMotor Co., 22 for example, a third-party counterclaim by a defendant automobile dealer against the manufacturing company was sustained and liability apportioned on a claim of implied warranty as well
as negligence. Apportionment in cases involving strict liability was not
so readily recognized, but would clearly seem to follow from the drift of
recent opinions.20 A leading case in the Dole revolution is Kelly v. Diesel
Constr. Co.,2' in which the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
concluded that neither logic nor policy could support a rule barring
indemnity from the actual wrongdoer. Recognizing that all the parties
are inevitably covered by insurance, the court sought to distribute the
judgment in accordance with the degrees of fault, thus permitting a
defendant, adjudged strictly liable, to recover from third parties who
might be proven the actual wrongdoers.2 2The applicability of the Kelly
position to air crash litigation is probably only a matter of time, but the
extent to which other jurisdictions will adopt and develop a similar
approach remains in question.
A number of policy considerations support the applicability of indemnity actions to aircraft manufacturer suits. Indemnity against the
air carrier would preclude the possibility of the latter's insulation from
liability, especially under circumstances of often-admitted or gross negligence, and thus would foster an important element of deterrence to the
airlines. It would also bring the manufacturer and air carrier onto an
even plane, both with respect to one another and vis A vis the passenger plaintiff, making it possible to litigate disputes between manufacturer and air carrier at the same time as the primary action.
. . [Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same
personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution
among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been
rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1401 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76). The codification avoids the use of the
word "tortfeasor," suggesting the applicability of the doctrine regardless of the nature of
the tort. For a discussion of related procedural problems, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1007
(McKinney Supp. 1975-76). Earlier cases suggesting the Dole approach include McFall
v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952) and cases cited in 42
C.J.S. Indemnity § 27 (1944).
229. 70 Misc.2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1972). For a federal court treatment
of the indemnity for implied warranty problem, see Coans v. Washington Mirror Works,
Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
230. See, e.g., Rubel v. Stackrow, 72 Misc.2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
indicating that the Dole rationale may be extended to an action based on an alleged willful
violation of a strict liability statute.
231. 35 N.Y.2d 1, 315 N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974).
232. Id. at 7, 315 N.E.2d at 753, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89.
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In summary, it is clear that something must be done to permit aircraft
manufacturers, who are now exposed to virtually unlimited liability by
virtue of strict products liability actions by passengers, to achieve a
position equitable with that of the Warsaw-protected airlines. Among
the alternatives for realigning possible liability, proposals for the elimination of the discriminatory liability limits and full right of contribution
or indemnity between the two tortfeasors appear the most attractive. A
simple increase of the current Montreal limitations or institution of
similar liability protection for manufacturers would fail to resolve the
serious inequities which separate the treatment of Radar and Vector.
Such solutions could only intensify the debate over the constitutionality
of limiting, by treaty or statute, a passenger's fair recovery for injury or
wrongful death. Whichever alternative is opted, the aircraft manufacturer anxiously awaits an end to the discriminatory practices that have
singled him out as the industry's principal risk-bearer.
CONCLUSION
When delegates to the Warsaw Convention drafted their original
agreement in 1929, they resolved many of the international difficulties
facing the then-budding aviation industry. The Convention standardized international practice for many of the rudimentary aspects of aviation procedure, resolved difficult problems of jurisdiction, and placed
what many considered to be necessary limitations on the liability of
struggling airlines in negligence suits brought by passengers. As the
years passed, however, developments in the aviation industry confronted the Convention with legal, political, and economic problems
which the original Warsaw delegates never anticipated. Negligence and
wrongful death recoveries mushroomed in size and the "infant industry"
rationale for airline protection dissipated, forcing the Hague Protocol,
Montreal Agreement, and proposed Guatemala Protocol to increase the
liability limitation many-fold. Other revolutions have occurred as well:
contribution between joint tortfeasors, long barred at common law, is
now becoming widely accepted in this country, and strict products liability has grown at a phenomenal pace, exposing the aircraft and components manufacturers to liability traditionally shouldered only by the
airline. Furthermore, a sharp rise in the incidence of terrorism directed
at the aviation community has created jurisdiction and liability problems unheard of only a few years ago. Not even the Hague, Montreal,
and Guatemala agreements have been able to handle these new threats
to traditional Warsaw Convention provisions.
This Comment has focused on three of the problems spawned by these
recent developments. Section I explored the scope of "embarking or
disembarking" under Article 17 of the Convention and determined that
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a narrow construction of that Article would allow passengers' actions in
airport terrorism cases to be governed by domestic law, thus freeing
their recoveries from low Warsaw limitations. Section II examined the
way in which Article 28(1) works to prevent domestic courts from entertaining suits for contribution by manufacturers against carriers, and
concluded that the terms, although not the policies, of Article 28(1)
should bar such actions. Finally, Section III dealt with the effect that
contribution and indemnity have on the liability of aircraft manufacturers and found that, among the various alternatives proposed, the best
solutions would be to eliminate present Convention liability limitations
and extend the right of indemnity or contribution to manufacturers
without regard to the particular nature of the wrong.
The individual sections of this Comment, then, have largely attempted to examine the issues raised by recent legal develoments in
light of the original Convention framework. Practical solutions necessarily must be found outside this structure, however, since the problems
generated by these developments are not addressed, let alone solved, by
the Convention. Clearly, profound changes are needed in the laws governing international air travel. As the interests of passengers, carriers,
and manufacturers conflict, it will be difficult to find solutions which
appeal to all the parties. In addition, there will be conflicts among the
nations adhering to the Convention. The United States' pro-passenger
bias stands in stark contrast to the desire of other nations to protect
their developing infant carriers. At best, international agreement on the
fundamental issue of limited carrier liability will be difficult, and will
require all countries to compromise their positions. Thus, it is possible
that the United States may not be able to obtain the uniformity which
will flow from an international agreement without assenting to some
form of limited carrier liability. While the process of balancing these
divergent interests will not be easy, and cannot hope to have results
which fully satisfy all interested parties, the need for change in this area
is paramount. Unless it attracts the early concern of all interested parties, issues of modern legal and political importance will continue to be
governed by a document drafted before such issues even arose.

